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INTRODUCTION
What should be antitrust’s role in regulating the design of
production, or the mechanisms by which products and services
are conceived, designed, and built? Should it be heavy handed,
particularly when it discovers a link between design and monopoly? Or should antitrust policy generally keep its hands off,
trusting that market forces will do better than the courts? Traditionally, antitrust has treated practices differently depending
on whether they were characterized as involving design or production on the one hand, or distribution on the other. Distri† James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and Wharton Business,
University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp for reading and commenting on a draft.

1155

R
R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN502.txt

1156

unknown

Seq: 2

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-AUG-18

12:29

[Vol. 103:1155

bution has received harsher treatment. The traditional per se
rules for vertical restraints, particularly resale price maintenance (RPM) and tying, were thought to be concerned with
restraints on distribution.
Although the courts do not view it that way, even per se
unlawful price fixing among rivals is a restraint on distribution
rather than production. That is, naked price fixing assumes a
product that has already been designed and built, and the
question at issue is what should be each firm’s output, or the
price charged to buyers. At the same time, however, many
price agreements among rivals are in fact a part of design or
production rather than distribution. Good examples are the
Supreme Court decisions in Trans-Missouri,1 Topco,2 Broadcast
Music,3 and Maricopa.4 In three out of four of these decisions
the United States Supreme Court reached the wrong result
because it did not realize that the practice it was examining
was a part of production design.5
A large amount of RPM, tying, and other vertical agreements are also design or production practices, some of which
use price as a facilitator. For example, someone who examines
a tying arrangement and sees only the prices might readily
conclude that the practice reduces welfare because it deviates
from some pricing norm associated with competition, such as
marginal cost. But for tying arrangements that is almost never
the right question to ask. Rather, it is how the tie reflects the
production or development strategies of the firms involved.
Nearly all ties come in one of two categories: they either incentivize innovation or else give effect to joint entrepreneurial risk
taking.6
Antitrust policy has a much greater role to play when the
practice in question is properly defined as distribution rather
than production. Too often, however, antitrust policy has mislocated the line between them. Much of what it characterizes
as “distribution” is really a part of design or production.
The federal antitrust laws are very general, reaching nearly
every American market and almost every practice that can be
characterized as anticompetitive. Nevertheless, almost nothing
in their language suggests a strong involvement with product
1
2
3
4
5
6

United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 214–30.
See discussion infra text accompanying note 137.
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design or innovation. The Sherman Act never mentions technology, patents, innovation, or anything closely associated with
them.7 It speaks only of restraints on trade and monopolization—two phenomena strongly associated with price and output. The Clayton Act, passed a quarter century later, mentions
patents a single time when forbidding unreasonably exclusionary vertical agreements.8 Even that statement is not concerned
with design but rather with the way that completed products
that might embody patents are distributed.
Nevertheless, the highly general antitrust laws remain as
one of the most important federal controls over how technology
is developed and deployed. Questions about technology have
been an important portion of antitrust law, including the many
decisions dealing with the relationship between federal antitrust and the patent or other intellectual property regimes.9
These many confrontations with technology include many of
antitrust law’s most important accomplishments, as well as
some of its most disheartening failures.10
Firms redesign their production in order to increase or preserve their market share in the face of changing competition or
consumer taste, both of which are often driven by changes in
technology. With this in mind, it is important to recall a few
premises that have largely become uncontroversial. One is
that pricing that seems noncompetitive in the short run is an
inherent feature of technological progress. This is largely a
function of two things: incentive effects and fixed costs. Firms
innovate in pursuit of profits. If they succeed, short-run prices
will be higher than short-run costs. Depriving firms of these
gains, whether by antitrust or some other means, reduces or
even eliminates the incentive to innovate. Further, innovation
typically involves fixed-cost investment made up front, and
that does not show up in variable costs. Nevertheless, these
must be paid off if the innovation is to be profitable. As a
7

15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2018).
15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (making it unlawful to sell or lease a good, “whether
patented or unpatented,” on the condition that the purchaser not deal with a
competitor, if appropriate injury to competition is proven).
9
For a full account see HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (3d ed.
2017).
10
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68
FLA. L. REV. 419, 454, 461 (2016) (describing the failures of the patent system in
permitting consumer challenges to patent practices, the use of antitrust law to
challenge those practices, and examples where antitrust law is complicated by
technologies functioning as both market substitutes and complements).
8
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result, pricing above short-run marginal cost is an inherent
feature of innovation.
Second, notwithstanding these price-cost deviations, technological progress indisputably contributes much more to economic growth than do improvements in price competition
under constant technology.11 This suggests that antitrust
must tread carefully before it condemns practices that are at
least arguably justified by technological choice. By contrast,
pure restraints on output or price deserve more aggressive
treatment.
An offsetting corollary, however, is that restraints on innovation can be more harmful than simple restraints on price or
quantity competition.12 This places a high premium on the fact
finder’s ability to distinguish something that is primarily an
innovation from something that is primarily a restraint on
innovation.
Many restraints that seem nominally to be about distribution or price are in fact mechanisms by which firms share
design and production activities. For example, tying arrangements, which are discussed below, are not simply ways of pricing finished goods. In many cases, either the primary good (the
“tying” product) or the secondary good (the “tied” product), or
frequently both, are the consequence of innovative activity, and
the tie serves as a royalty substitute.13 Other ties are ways in
which firms share entrepreneurial risk or costs of
development.14
Further, because so many innovation decisions are driven
by the availability of patents or other IP rights, we must consider how antitrust policy relates to the patent system. Antitrust and patent law have their own spheres of comparative
advantage. Patent law is concerned with the process of patent
creation, procurement, and enforcement through infringement
actions.15 To the extent that these processes are mandated or
authorized by the Patent Act and administered by the USPTO,
Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court, antitrust
has little place. Once a patent is issued, however, the amount
11
For a summary of the literature see CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 8–11, 238–42 (2012).
12
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247,
254 (2007).
13
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 97, 115.
14
See discussion infra text accompanying note 137.
15
In contrast to enforcement by breach of contract suits for violation of
license agreements. These are ordinarily governed by state law.
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of supervision and authorization conferred by the Patent Act is
relatively small and is largely limited to a few provisions concerning licensing,16 enforcement through infringement actions,17 and post-grant review.18
This Article discusses the proper boundaries of antitrust’s
engagement with product design or production. First, it considers the traditional antitrust distinction between production
and distribution. That distinction has undermined effective
antitrust rulemaking by creating an image of two successive
but discrete stages. In the product design stage, the manufacturer is presumed to be in charge. In the second stage, production is assumed to be complete and a variety of distribution
mechanisms come into play.
Distribution refers to a set of markets or hierarchies by
which a firm either acquires inputs from others or moves its
finished product toward the consumer. Many changes in distribution practices have resulted from the growing predominance of manufactured products over commodities. Along with
this comes increased complexity and differentiation among
brands. Complexity naturally increases the degree of distributor or reseller involvement; differentiation increases their dedication to a particular brand.19
As a result of these changes, intermediaries including retailers often do much more than sell. Many of these other
activities resemble production more than distribution. For decades, antitrust resisted this distribution revolution by clinging
to concepts such as the common-law policy disfavoring restraints on alienation.20 As the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Impression Products suggests, that relic still survives in
patent policy.21 Restricted distribution mechanisms are a form
of restraint on alienation, but they are also welfare enhancing
in most cases, including Impression Products.22
16
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018) (authorizing licensing, including some exclusive
and territorially limited licensing); id. § 262 (assignment and licensing under joint
ownership); id. § 271(d) (permitting refusals to license, and also tying conditions
in patent licenses in absence of market power).
17
Id. § 271 (authorizing and circumscribing infringement actions); id.
§§ 281–90 (miscellany governing remedies, statute of limitations, attorneys’ fees,
infringement actions on patents containing an invalid claim notice).
18
Id. §§ 321–29 (authorizing and creating process for post-grant review).
19
See discussion infra Part I.B.
20
See discussion infra Part I.A.
21
Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531–32
(2017).
22
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Reasonable Patent Exhaustion, 35 YALE J. ON REG.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2995751 [https://perma.cc/V5XS-FS8Q].
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Second, central to these changes has been the bewildering
range of patent and antitrust cases that fall under the general
rubric of “tying.” That term can refer to practically any situation in which two things that traditionally were available separately are bundled together.23 As such, they account for a large
portion of the cases where antitrust has engaged technology.
While tying law has historically been treated as presenting
questions about contracting and distribution, it should more
properly be treated as dealing with product design or entrepreneurial risk sharing. People on both sides of the tying
debate have been excessively obsessed with price effects.24
A third issue queries antitrust’s role in policing the substance of innovation itself. Important innovations necessarily
cause market dislocations, benefiting innovators and usually
consumers, injuring many competitors, and affecting other entities in different ways depending on their position. Are any of
these injuries ever cognizable under antitrust law, and if so
when? Should the courts acknowledge a welfare “trade off”
between the benefits conferred by an innovation and the harms
it causes to others? For example, should antitrust have a role
when an innovation is said to be minor or even trivial as a
technical contribution but nevertheless causes a great deal of
economic harm to other producers? If an antitrust tribunal is
going to recognize that possibility at all, where should it draw
the line?25
Finally, is the issue of competitor agreements that constrain independent output or pricing choices. Changes in production design often disrupt markets, sometimes when they
involve new technology but also when they involve innovations
in product delivery. In most cases the effects are temporary
and the market rights itself, but that does not invariably happen and often the transition period is long and costly. Further,
these innovations often require collaboration among multiple
competing firms. These market changes produce both losers
and gainers, and losers often invoke the antitrust laws for relief. One of the most serious errors antitrust enforcement can
make is to condemn practices too early, before either the innovation or the market response is adequately understood. This
is particularly true of price-affecting agreements among competitors. While naked price-fixing is a restraint on distribution,
23
Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust
Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926 (2010).
24
See discussion infra subsection II.B.2.a.
25
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 173–75.
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many such agreements in fact reorganize production and, as
such, should be treated more leniently under the antitrust
laws.26
One issue not treated here as a distinct category is efficiency. That might seem odd, given the centrality of efficiency
concerns in any antitrust policy concerning the design of production, and new technology in particular. The explanation is
that concerns about efficiency are pervasive, relevant in all of
the areas described above. Further, efficiency concerns are
nearly always presented as defenses. That is, antitrust does
not have a policy of pursuing practices simply because they are
inefficient. They must be anticompetitive as well. In nearly
every antitrust case where efficiency is relevant, the dispute
begins as a claim about some specific anticompetitive practice
and efficiency is raised as a defense. With only a few historical
exceptions, antitrust policy has avoided pursuing efficiency itself as an antitrust violation.27
I
PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, AND ALIENATION
Both industrial organization economics and antitrust policy have traditionally distinguished “production” and “distribution.” The former is concerned with how products are designed
and built. The latter begins with finished products and considers how they are placed into the hands of consumers. Under
this rubric, for example, tying law falls within the classification
of distribution restraints, along with RPM and exclusive dealing.28 This sharp distinction between product design or production on the one hand, and distribution on the other,
accounts for many of the difficulties that antitrust law has had
in dealing with vertical restraints. These difficulties often arise
because antitrust courts mistakenly view a certain practice as
part of distribution when it should have been regarded as part
of design or production.
26

See discussion infra text accompanying note 195.
One exception was merger policy in the 1960s, which condemned some
mergers precisely because they generated lower costs, thus injuring rivals. E.g.,
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960,
95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 881–83 (2010).
28
E.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST ch. 8 (4th ed. 2005) (“Vertical Mergers and Vertical Restraints,” which includes exclusive dealing and tying).
27
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This hard distinction between production and distribution
is obsolete.29 It grew out of a classical economic framework
that was concerned largely with commodities.30 Firms manufactured finished products and then sold them at wholesale to
largely anonymous jobbers, factors,31 distributors, or dealers
who eventually passed them on to consumers. Within this
framework “production” stopped at a discrete point in time and
then “distribution” began.
Today, distribution is often so completely intertwined with
production that the two are indistinguishable. Durable manufactured goods have specialized aftermarket parts or require
aftermarket consumables that must be designed and delivered
jointly between manufacturers and dealers. Some products are
incompletely manufactured at the production point, to be assembled or finished further downstream. Many durable products require maintenance, often performed by dealers rather
than manufacturers. Further, many products require an ongoing supply of specialized parts or consumable components.
A. Restraints on Alienation
One relic of the production/distribution distinction, largely
abandoned in antitrust law but surviving in patent law, is the
concept of restraints on alienation as a business concern. In
its 1911 Dr. Miles decision, which created a per se rule against
RPM, the Supreme Court cited the common-law policy against
restraints on alienation as giving dealers an antitrust right to
set their own resale prices.32 The concern had shown up earlier in the lower courts. In his Sixth Circuit opinion in a related
case, then-Circuit Judge Lurton condemned RPM after concluding that the “right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in movables,” and that
public policy is “best subserved by great freedom of traffic in
such things as pass from hand to hand.”33 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court cited the concern with restraints on alienation
29
I myself have followed it. See, e.g., 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 16 (4th ed. 2017) (“Vertical Distribution Restraints
Limiting Intrabrand Competition”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE ch. 11 (5th ed. 2016) (“Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution”).
30
See, e.g., HAROLD D. WOODMAN, KING COTTON AND HIS RETAINERS: FINANCING &
MARKETING THE COTTON CROP OF THE SOUTH, 1800–1925, at 254–95 (1968) (detailing
the role of factors in the distinct processes of agricultural production and
distribution).
31
On the role of agricultural “factors” see id.
32
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911).
33
John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907).
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in cases involving vertical nonprice restraints.34 Most recently,
the Supreme Court relied on it in refusing to enforce a tying
arrangement by means of a patent infringement suit.35
While sitting on both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme
Court, Judge Lurton also authored the two principal decisions
upholding tying arrangements imposed on sold goods and enforced by patent infringement actions, never mentioning concerns with restraints on alienation. The earlier case preceded
his RPM decision36 and the later case followed it,37 so he apparently did not change his views. Rather, Lurton believed that
the law of restraints on alienation applied to price restraints
such as RPM, though not to nonprice restraints such as tying.38 Is it possible that he recognized a difference between the
two practices? While he kept his reasons to himself, he may
have thought that RPM relates purely to pricing, while tying
relates to product design and function.39
Many of the decisions citing restraints on alienation as an
antitrust or patent licensing concern relied on John Chipman
Gray’s influential book, Restraints on the Alienation of Property,40 although taken completely out of context. Gray’s book
34
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 394 (1967); see also
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264–65 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (citing concern with restraints on alienation); United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300, 305–06 (1919) (citing every seller’s right to deal or not as it
chose).
35
Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 (2017).
36
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288
(6th Cir. 1896).
37
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
38
Compare John D. Park, 153 F. at 39 (“A prime objection to the enforcibility
[sic] of . . . a system of restraint upon sales and prices is that they offend against
the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels or articles which pass by
mere delivery.”), with Heaton-Peninsular, 77 F. at 292 (“If . . . the patentee has the
exclusive right to the use of his invention or discovery, during the term of his
patent, it would seem to follow that any use by another, unauthorized by the
patentee, would be an infringement of his monopoly. If, therefore, he can find a
purchaser for a machine subject only to certain specified uses, any violation of the
privilege granted would be an infringement, for which . . . remedies . . . would be
appropriate.”).
39
In his dissent in Henry, Chief Justice White (joined by Justices Hughes and
Lamar) located the difference in the fact that Dr. Miles applied to contracts generally, while Henry applied to patent law. White made clear that he believed that
this distinction was improper because of its ability to run roughshod over state
law. See Henry, 224 U.S. at 54–55 (White, C.J., dissenting). He later found an
absolute inconsistency between the two decisions. Id. at 71. Justice Holmes was
a silent member of the Henry majority. He had also dissented in Dr. Miles. He
would have supported enforcement of the agreements in both cases.
40
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY §§ 27–28
(1895); see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405
(1911) (citing Gray).
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was concerned almost entirely with the use of alienation restraints in trusts and other instruments intended to preserve
family wealth. Gray never discussed patents or other intellectual property rights in relation to alienation restraints. He also
never discussed the subject of restricted commercial distribution. The concerns are fundamentally very different. As a
wealth preservation device, restraints on alienation were intended to keep property within the family. By contrast, the
whole point of commercial distribution is resale. A manufacturer who imposes RPM or tying is not trying to prevent a
dealer from reselling the product or even requiring him to keep
it for a longer time. Rather, the manufacturer wishes to control
the terms or other circumstances of a resale or change the
behavior of the reseller in some other way. Indeed, the reason
we apply the rule of reason to such restraints today is that we
believe they are likely to encourage more sales rather than
fewer. To the extent a vertical practice makes sales more likely
it can hardly be characterized as a restraint on alienation.
In any event, the common law of restraints on alienation
was far more nuanced than the antitrust and patent restricted
distribution cases acknowledged. Both English and American
law permitted significant restrictions, provided that they fell
short of absolute prohibitions on resale. For example, the common law permitted many restraints that were of limited duration.41 The mid-nineteenth century British decision in Tulk v.
Moxhay permitted equitable enforcement of land use restrictions,42 and so-called covenants running with the land were
widely enforced even during the era of Dr. Miles.43 In the
1920s, even covenants that restricted the sale of property to
specific races were enforced by state courts and approved for a
time by the Supreme Court.44 The Dr. Miles opinion did not say
whether it was drawing its rationale from the established com41

Hovenkamp, supra note 22 (manuscript at 25–26).
Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1143; 2 Ph. 774, 774.
43
E.g., Korn v. Campbell, 85 N.E. 687 (N.Y. 1908) (covenant to build only
single-family home); Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 187 (1871) (covenant to
maintain a fence).
44
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926) (ruling that racially restrictive covenant was purely private action and did not invoke a federal question); see
also L.A. Inv. Co. v. Gary, 186 P. 596, 598 (Cal. 1919) (rejecting Equal Protection
challenge to covenant limiting occupancy to members of Caucasian race because
the Clause applied only to government action); Parmalee v. Morris, 188 N.W. 330,
332 (Mich. 1922) (upholding racially restrictive covenant); Koehler v. Rowland,
205 S.W. 217, 222 (Mo. 1918) (upholding racially restrictive covenant). Such
restrictions were eventually declared unenforceable under the Equal Protection
Clause by Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1948) (overruling Corrigan v.
Buckley).
42

R
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mon law of restraints on alienation or developing a new antitrust rule just for antitrust cases.45 Writing in dissent, Justice
Holmes could find no precedent for it, and concluded that the
majority was “extending a certain conception of public policy to
a new sphere.”46 The closest analogy he could find was combinations to exclude, but he found no exclusion in this case.47
On the common law, Holmes was correct. Although the cases
were divided, most approved of RPM.48 While on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts two years prior to his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Holmes himself had
authored an opinion enforcing an RPM agreement.49
Gray wrote his important treatise on Restraints on Alienation just as manufacturers were expanding the use of controlled distribution networks that increased the number of
commercial distribution restraints.50 Under the evolving law
resellers were regarded much less as anonymous agents who
purchased a product and sold it on their own terms, and more
as arms of the manufacturer, improving the consumer experience with a product and transmitting its goodwill.51
Antitrust courts found restricted distribution difficult to
assess. RPM remained per se illegal for about a century, although it became subject to many qualifications that limited its

45

Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404.
Id. at 411 (“[T]here is no body of precedent that, by ineluctable logic, requires the conclusion to which the court has come.”).
47
Id. at 412.
48
See Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Kelley, 127 S.W. 975, 982 (Ark. 1910)
(upholding RPM contract at common law); Grogan v. Chaffee, 105 P. 745, 748
(Cal. 1909) (same); Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 63 S.W. 427, 427 (Ky. 1901)
(RPM not unlawful under state antitrust statute); Garst v. Charles, 72 N.E. 839,
840 (Mass. 1905) (enforcing RPM contract at common law); Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo.
App. 602, 604–05 (1885) (upholding RPM but citing fact that the contract at issue
did not dominate the entire market). The courts were not unanimous, however.
See W.H. Hill Co. v Gray & Worcester, 127 N.W. 803, 808 (Mich. 1910) (voiding
RPM contracts covering a large portion of the industry as restraining trade).
49
Garst v. Harris, 58 N.E. 174 (Mass. 1900).
50
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 124–29 (2015).
51
E.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454–56 (1922) (food
products); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210–11 (1921)
(restricted distribution of cleansers); United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252
U.S. 85, 99–100 (1920) (automobile parts); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307–08 (1919) (RPM in toothpaste and other toiletries); Straus v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1917) (phonographs and related
supplies); Sinclair Refining Co. v. FTC, 276 F. 686, 689–90 (7th Cir. 1921) (use of
agency system by full service gasoline stations), aff’d, 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
46
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reach.52 For nonprice restraints, exclusive dealing, and tying,
the courts meandered from tolerance in the 1920s, to hostility
from the 1930s through the 1970s, and then back to greater
tolerance. For example, in 1921, the Second Circuit wrote a
defense of restricted distribution in gasoline that could as easily have been written today. In rejecting an FTC campaign to
require gasoline refiners to permit “split pump” stations,53 it
wrote:
Every pumping station is an advertisement; each bears
the name of the oil producer whose gasoline is supplied
therefrom, if the retailer honestly observes his bargain. The
system is a great convenience to the public; it has increased
enormously the ease with which motor drivers may obtain
“gas” even in remote and thinly settled districts. It is the only
method known or suggested, of keeping before the consuming public the oil manufacturers’ trade-mark . . . .
. . . The majority of small dealers have small capital, and
therefore lease rather than buy. It is perfectly possible to buy
from the same manufacturers who supply to the oil dealers
the pumps leased by the latter. The competition between the
various oil-selling persons and corporations is and has been
very keen; each is desirous of extending the sale of his own
brand, and the system of leased pumps, each bearing the
trade-mark or trade-name of its lessor, is regarded by many,
though not all, wholesalers as a profitable form of
advertisement.54

By the late 1970s the Supreme Court concluded in Sylvania, which overruled the per se rule against vertical nonprice
restraints, that most writers regarded the Supreme Court’s use
of restraint-on-alienation rationales in cases involving vertical
restraints as “both a misreading of legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis.”55

52
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at ¶¶ 1620–27. The per se rule
was finally rejected in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S.
877, 899 (2007).
53
That is, stations that simultaneously sold multiple brands of gasoline. See
DON E. WALDMAN & ELIZABETH J. JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 610 (4th ed. 2013). In 1923, the Supreme Court also accepted the argument
that refiners needed to prohibit split-pump stations in order to prevent dealers
from mixing higher and lower quality gasoline. See FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
261 U.S. 463, 476 (1923). It changed its position in the Standard Stations decision. See discussion infra note 57.
54
Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. v. FTC, 273 F. 478, 480 (2d Cir. 1921).
55
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
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B. Production, Distribution, and the Firm
The economic theory of the firm has also come to regard
the traditional distinction between production and distribution
as meaningless. Ronald Coase’s insight in The Nature of the
Firm was that the size and shape of a firm are determined by a
series of decisions in which managers compare the costs and
benefits of internal versus external provision.56 If the manager
of an automobile maker predicts a better payoff from self-production of windshield wiper blades, it will produce them. By
contrast, if independent manufacturers of blades provide advantages sufficient to offset the costs of using the market, the
automaker will purchase them. The same thing is true of the
decision whether to engage in self-distribution to the retail level
or to use independent, franchised car dealers. Whether the
decision concerns “production” (making one’s own wiper
blades) or “distribution” (selling cars through wholly owned or
franchised dealers) is not a matter of importance.
Rules limiting restraints on alienation interfere with efficient firm structure by providing differential treatment depending on whether a firm engages in self-distribution or distributes
by contract. For example, the manufacturer that owns its own
retail stores is free to set the price because no one’s right to
alienate is being restrained. By contrast, as soon as that manufacturer deals with an independent retailer the concern
emerges.
Looking ex ante, the firm engaged in make-or-buy decisions and operating under a restraint-on-alienation rule will
inefficiently choose “make” when “buy” would be preferable.
For example, in a neutral legal environment a firm would compare the cost of retailing its own gasoline with the cost of using
independent dealers and choose the one with the largest payoff. That could well be independent dealers because they enable the firm to share downstream risk, and owner-dealers may
have incentives that employees lack. But suppose that the law
forbids the firm from restricting the dealers to its own brand of
gasoline, as the Supreme Court did in the Standard Stations
case,57 effectively overruling the Second Circuit’s decision
quoted above.58 The Standard Stations decision, which required refiners to permit split-pump stations, effectively elimi56

See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 404–05 (1937).
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States (Standard Stations) 337 U.S. 293,
314 (1949) (condemning exclusive dealing by nondominant refiner).
58
Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 273 F. at 480. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 50–51.
57
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nated the independent franchised dealer as a branded agent for
its supplier, significantly undermining the ability of refiners to
develop branded distribution networks.59 It basically treated
gasoline as a commodity, which the dealer was entitled to buy
and resell without refiner control. Although Justice Douglas
very likely had never read Coase, his Standard Stations dissent
was prescient:
The elimination of these requirements contracts sets the
stage for Standard and the other oil companies to build service-station empires of their own. The opinion of the Court
does more than set the stage for that development. It is an
advisory opinion as well, stating to the oil companies how
they can with impunity build their empires. The formula
suggested by the Court is either the use of the “agency” device,60 which in practical effect means control of filling stations by the oil companies, or the outright acquisition of them
by subsidiary corporations or otherwise.61

Justice Douglas realized that the mandatory toleration of
split pumps completely changed the calculus of a firm weighing
the costs and benefits of alternative distribution modes. By
raising the cost of contractual distribution, the Court was effectively forcing the firm to engage in ownership distribution.
The antitrust analysis of vertical restraints remained on
the wrong track until courts began to realize that dealers and
other intermediaries often perform important production functions, requiring significant supplier oversight. The optimal
amount of dealer involvement in production varies with the
extent of product differentiation and complexity, the extent of
customer familiarity, the amount of aftermarket service that is
required, the nature and specificity of aftermarket parts, and
the amount and nature of risk that dealers assume. Further,
these needs vary with the product. Early on, when products
are new and consumers are poorly informed about them, relatively greater supplier involvement will be required. Later on,
however, when customers have become better educated, the

59

See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 320–21.
A mechanism by which the stations would not purchase the gasoline at all
but rather sell it on commission. See FTC v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 260 U.S. 568, 570
(1923) (distinguishing sale-plus-resale from sale on commission, and holding that
§ 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to the former); cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24–25 (1964) (refusing to apply “agency” designation to firm
that purported to give its gasoline on consignment to dealers in order to avoid
RPM rule).
61
Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 320 (citation omitted).
60
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role of distributors
commoditized.62

more

and

dealers

will

become

C. Choice of a Distribution Mode: Legal Consequences
The set of practices that we traditionally describe as distribution can take place either within the firm, as when a manufacturer owns its own retail stores, or outside it, as when it
uses contracts with others. These are alternative forms of organization that presumptively have no consequences for competition. A firm selects one or the other depending on the
payoff, and some firms use a mixture.63
The antitrust statutes distinguish unilateral from multilateral conduct, however, and have been interpreted to apply a
harsher standard to the latter.64 A firm acting through wholly
owned stores is engaged in unilateral conduct which is reachable, if at all, under § 2 of the Sherman Act as unlawful monopolization or attempt. Both the power and conduct
requirements are relatively strict, and § 2 is concerned only
with practices that exclude or threaten exclusion.65
By contrast, a firm whose relationship with its retailers is
contractual is a party to an agreement and is thus subject to
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, which reaches contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.66 It can also be
subject to § 3 of the Clayton Act, which reaches tying and exclusive dealing only when there is an anticompetitive “condition” or “understanding,” which is also an agreement.67
Further, these practices are subject to a “restraint of trade”
62
E.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa.
1960) (discussing how early in a product lifecycle a bundled provision of all
elements was necessary to make product work properly, but not after the product
had become well understood by consumers).
63
For example, in “dual distribution” systems a manufacturer distributes
part of its output through wholly owned subsidiaries and another part through
independent franchisees. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, ¶ 1605, at 77.
64
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
108 (2005) (“Antitrust is more hospitable to unilateral conduct than to conduct
that results from an agreement between two or more firms. Not every unilateral
act is lawful, and it is hardly the case that every multilateral act is unlawful.
Nevertheless, the difference in attitude is both clear and justified.”).
65
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”).
66
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“Every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”).
67
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (2018)).
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standard, which means that they can reach practices that reduce output and raise prices even if they are not exclusionary.
The Robinson-Patman Act,68 which was passed in 1936 at
the high point of hostility toward controlled distribution,
adopts the same limiting approach. Because the statute applies its price discrimination prohibition only to low and high
price “sales,” it reaches networks in which a manufacturer operates through independently owned dealers, though not networks of wholly owned dealers.69 In the latter instance, there is
no qualifying “sale” between the manufacturer and the
dealer.70
This bit of statutory formalism has misguided antitrust
since its inception, providing for more aggressive treatment
against firms that integrate vertically by contract than those
who do so by ownership. To be sure, in some situations the
existence of separate entities plus an agreement is relevant.
For example, powerful dealers or cartels of dealers can profit
from activities that restrict output, counter to the wishes of the
supplier.71 That would not happen if the supplier owned its
dealers.
D. Vertical Agreements, Intrabrand, and Interbrand
The problem of powerful dealers, dealer cartels, or related
deviations from ordinary output-maximizing conduct is generally restricted to “intrabrand” restraints, which include RPM
and vertical spatial separation, or nonprice restraints. Intrabrand restraints can reflect both dealer involvement in production or anticompetitive price-fixing, depending on the
circumstances. To illustrate, Lester Telser’s well-known article
about fair trade argued that at least some instances of RPM
were designed to induce more optimal dealer involvement
through provision of services that were best provided at the
point of sale.72 Setup, display, consumer education, and follow-through were all parts of the production process that the
68

15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
See Sec. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 966 (5th
Cir. 1979) (“Transfers from a parent corporation to its wholly-owned subsidiary
corporation are transfers within the same economic unit. . . . As such, these
transfers cannot be considered sales for Robinson-Patman Act purposes.”), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
70
See id.; 14 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 ¶¶ 2311, 2312, at 17 (3d
ed. 2013).
71
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, ¶ 1604, at 39.
72
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 86, 91 (1960).
69
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manufacturer could not easily supervise from afar. RPM plus
interdealer nonprice competition became a way to get retailers
to do it.73 Telser’s free rider explanation explains only a subset
of the instances of RPM, however. Other instances result from
dealer collusion or the activities of powerful dealers who want
to protect their own high margins.74 So, the real antitrust
question in RPM cases under the rule of reason is whether a
particular instance of RPM is really a part of production, or is it
a simply price restraint?
By contrast, “interbrand” restraints, which include tying
and exclusive dealing, are rarely favored by dealers. A dealer
might wish that other dealers be bound by exclusive dealing or
tying requirements, but it would not commonly seek them for
itself. It would rather make its own choice about whether to
deal in the supplier’s product exclusively. To that extent, exclusive dealing and tying are unlikely to be explained by dealer
power and can be regarded as having about the same effects as
vertical ownership.
The important differences between exclusive dealing or tying on one side and vertical ownership on the other are largely
legal rather than economic. For example, if Lexmark owned its
own retail stores, the refusal of those stores to carry Canon
printers would be treated under antitrust law as a unilateral
refusal to deal, which means more-or-less automatic legality.75
By contrast, if Lexmark sells to an independent retailer and
imposes the same requirement, it would be exclusive dealing.
The same thing is true of tying. For example, fast-food
franchisor Chicken Delight’s insistence that wholly owned restaurants use its own napkins and spoons would be unilateral
self-dealing. The same requirement imposed on independently
owned franchisees was held to be unlawful tying.76
Contrary to the existing statutory structure, tying and exclusive dealing in distribution arrangements should generally
be treated as “unilateral” practices, even though they are imposed by agreement. They do not represent the incremental
opportunity to exercise power that we ordinarily associate with
the move from unilateral to bilateral conduct. As a result, the
market power requirements for tying and exclusive dealing
73

Id.
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, ¶ 1604a, at 39.
75
See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 409 (2004) (refusing to condemn unilateral refusal to deal by a
monopolist).
76
See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46, 49 (9th Cir. 1971).
74
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should presumptively be the same as for single-firm monopolization.77 Further, they should not be condemned unless they
are exclusionary and not simply because they extract more
from customers.78
Manufacturer decisions to employ exclusive dealing or tying generally fall into two categories. When exclusive dealing is
imposed on dealers in branded goods, its purpose is generally
to get dealers to behave in the same way a wholly owned subsidiary would behave—that is, it operates as an alternative to
ownership–vertical integration. For example, Baskin-Robbins
imposes exclusive dealing on franchisees because it wants
them to be stores specializing in the sale of Baskin-Robbins ice
cream.79 That decision is no more exclusionary than BaskinRobbins’ decision to sell ice cream through wholly owned
stores.
Exclusive dealing is more likely to be anticompetitive when
it is used by dominant firms in a way that effectively requires
end users to purchase exclusively or substantially from the
firm in question.80 Significantly, Baskin-Robbins’ decision to
use exclusive dealing in order to achieve single branding can be
profitable even if its market share is very small. By contrast,
using exclusive dealing to achieve anticompetitive exclusion
requires a dominant market share.81 As a result, significant
market power is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for
competitive harm.
Tying, discussed more fully below, can be used for the
same purposes as exclusive dealing. More than any of the
vertical restraints, however, tying is closely bound up with production. The particular configuration or design of a product or
service is likely to be the dominant factor in the decision to tie.
For example, if one thinks of a good such as a laser printer as
“finished,” then a manufacturer’s requirement tying its
77
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, __
FLA. L. REV. ___ (2018) (in press).
78
See discussion supra text accompanying note 77; discussion infra text
accompanying notes 144–45.
79
See Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 112 (C.D. Cal.
1978), aff’d, 664 F.2d 1348, 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to condemn
franchisor’s requirement, brought as both tying and exclusive dealing, that franchisee’s deal exclusively in franchisor’s ice cream).
80
See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 836 (11th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).
81
Cf. Jonathan M. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, “No Economic Sense” Makes No
Sense for Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 791 (2006) (indicating that
exclusive dealing is more effective as an anticompetitive tool when a firm holds a
dominant market share).
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aftermarket toner cartridges sounds like a restraint on distribution.82 By contrast, if the market is for printing services in
which the printer and its cartridges are vital components, then
the tie is more a part of production. The cartridge must be
designed to work in a particular manufacturer’s printer. The
printer maker may be expected to provide warranty services if
the combination fails to deliver as promised. The home or office
printer plus separately purchased cartridges competes with
commercial printing services. In the latter instance, the consumer is largely uninformed and very likely indifferent about
how and from where the printer and the cartridge were acquired. If both the printer and the cartridge are protected by
patents, then patent law may limit the ability of customers to
substitute away from the manufacturer’s printer/cartridge
combination. Finally, products are sometimes designed in
such a way that two components will not work unless they are
used together. That was true of Kodak’s famous Instamatic
camera plus film cartridge in the Berkey Photo case.83 It was
also the case for Microsoft’s “commingling” of the software code
for its Windows computing operating system and its Internet
Explorer web browser.84
As the next section elaborates, many tying arrangements
result from design choices. One manifestation of this is the
fifty-year history of tying cases in patent law before there were
any antitrust laws.
II
TECHNOLOGY AND TYING
“Tying” occurs when someone combines two products that
had previously been regarded as separate and refuses to sell
them individually.85 Anyone who looks at the history of tying is
struck by its close linkage with design—more particularly, with
invention, patenting, and technology. The reason is intuitively
easy to explain. New technologies change product boundaries.
This process involves both disaggregation of what previously
82
See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1530–31
(2017).
83
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir.
1979); see discussion infra text accompanying notes 147–51.
84
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64–65 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(concluding that Microsoft’s commingling of operating system and Internet
browser code violated § 2 of the Sherman Act).
85
See David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie?
Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON
REG. 37, 41 (2005).
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had been made or sold together and aggregation of what previously had been separate. As an example of disaggregation,
what a fireplace might have accomplished in the early nineteenth century would later be performed by a furnace, a
kitchen stove, and a toaster. Or, a farmer that used hand tools
to grow a variety of crops would later use specialized equipment
and concentrate on one or two crops. Innovation-induced disaggregation occurs less frequently than aggregation. Further it
is much less likely to cause the dislocations, or destruction of
previous investment that has accompanied aggregation. For
example, if GE makes furnaces, kitchen stoves, and toasters it
would be quite happy to sell you one of each. As a result, you
can still replace all the functions of your fireplace from the
same seller.
Innovation-induced aggregation is another matter, and it
sometimes wipes out entire industries. For example, the deployment of the automobile severely damaged the formerly separate markets for horses and wagons or buggies, to say nothing
of buggy whips and blacksmiths. The development of the personal computer, largely attributed to IBM, virtually ruined an
industry of businesses that had made freestanding computer
components that customers could acquire separately and combine for themselves.86 Innovation-induced tying is often coercive, in the sense that sellers of the new product are unable or
unwilling to sell things separately. In an earlier day, horses
and buggies were customarily sold separately. Today, automobile manufacturers bundle automobiles with their engines.
The same is true of computers and disc drives. This is why we
have a significant law of tying, but not of untying.87
Several phenomena account for the link between tying and
technology. These include: (1) product complexity; (2) manufacturing and functional economies, particularly economies of
scope;88 (3) product differentiation; (4) dedicated aftermarkets;
(5) attempts to maximize the value of intellectual property
rights, including metering or price discrimination; (6) economies of distribution; (7) joint risk taking or entrepreneurship;
and (8) exclusion, or attempts to protect one’s own market from
competitors’ entry or growth.89
86
See FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JOHN J. MCGOWAN & JOEN E. GREENWOOD, FOLDED,
SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM (1983).
87
For example, the Antitrust Law treatise’s treatment of tying law runs to
over 1000 pages. 9 & 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 ch. 17 (in press).
88
Economies of scope are cost savings that accrue because doing two or more
things together is cheaper than doing each one separately.
89
See Evans & Salinger, supra note 85, at 50, 52, 81.
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Most of these rationales suggest procompetitive, welfareincreasing results, and none is inherently anticompetitive. The
most likely candidate for competitive harm is number 8, or
attempts to protect oneself from competition. Such attempts
can be anticompetitive under the right structural conditions,
but they are not always so. Number 5, capitalizing on IP rights,
has been regarded as anticompetitive,90 but making that case
is difficult unless the conduct is also exclusionary.91
A. Tying in Patent Law
The history of tying law illustrates its close connection with
technology, design, and innovation. Although it was not called
by that name, tying was well developed as a part of patent law
long before there were any antitrust laws. In the nineteenth
century, tying or analogous practices raised issues under several patent law doctrines, including the “repair/reconstruction” distinction, the appropriate scope of so-called
“combination patents,” contributory infringement, and patent
exhaustion. A little later came the judge-made patent-law doctrine of “misuse,” and antitrust law only after that. By the time
ties were first addressed under the antitrust laws, dozens of
decisions had considered them under patent law.
This early patent law of tying did not expressly address
issues of competition policy but focused instead on the proper
scope of a patent, particularly where a patented device contained multiple parts with different lifecycles, or contemplated
the use of unpatented complementary goods. Suppose that a
patented phonograph device used unpatented wax discs to
make sound recordings. To what extent should we consider
the disc to be a part of the device? More to the point, should we
permit the patentee seller to insist that purchasers cannot use
discs from a different provider without committing patent infringement? Decisions like this were common in the nineteenth century long before the antitrust laws were passed.
The earliest patent cases that included tying-like issues
concerned patent law’s distinction between “repair” and “reconstruction.” Under patent law, the purchaser of a patented
good is entitled to repair it, but “reconstructing” it is a form of
90
E.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395–96 (1947) (antitrust);
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (patent
misuse).
91
On nonexcluding ties see 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at ¶¶
1722–25 (forthcoming).
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duplication constituting patent infringement.92 In 1850, the
Supreme Court held that the purchaser of a wood-planing machine was free to replace the machine’s worn out cutter knives
with knives that he had either made for himself or procured
from someone other than the patentee.93 As the Supreme
Court observed, the machine’s cutter knives wore out at “short
intervals,” rendering the machine unusable until they were replaced.94 Further, this was an inherent part of the “arrange[ment]” or design of the machine.95 Justice Holmes made
a similar observation dispositive, concluding that when a durable copy machine used gelatin bands that wore out after a few
uses, the purchaser of the machine had a right to obtain replacement bands from any source.96 In its last considered
treatment of the issue in 1961, the Supreme Court held that
replacement of the worn-out fabric of a patented convertible
automobile top was a permissible “repair” rather than an infringing “reconstruction.”97
What if the short lifecycle portion of an invention is something that is used only once? In that situation, the Supreme
Court observed in Morgan Envelope, “the distinction between
repair and reconstruction becomes of no value.”98 That patentee produced a toilet–paper dispenser sold in combination with
unpatented rolls of toilet paper.99 Replacing the spent toilet
paper was neither a repair nor a reconstruction, as the Court
92
Recent examples exist. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. ITC, 474 F.3d
1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refurbishing of camera intended to be disposable by
replacing the back cover was a permissible repair, not a reconstruction); Surfco
Haw. v. Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (replacing
fins on a surfboard was a repair, not an infringing reconstruction of the board).
93
Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109, 109 (1850).
94
Id. at 125.
95
Id. at 125–26 (“The right of the assignee to replace the cutter-knives is not
because they are of perishable materials, but because the inventor of the machine
has so arranged them as a part of its combination, that the machine could not be
continued in use without a succession of knives at short intervals. Unless they
were replaced, the invention would have been but of little use to the inventor or to
others.”); see also Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co, 75
F. 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1896) (noting that one who purchases a combination
patent covering a set of connection devices enabling the transmission of power
from its source to a moving train is free to replace a worn-out part from a source
other than the patentee); Shickle, Harrison & Howard Iron Co. v. St. Louis CarCoupler Co., 77 F. 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1896) (noting that purchaser of a patented
device “consisting of several distinct parts” has a right to repair it by replacing a
worn-out part, provided that this part is not separately patented).
96
Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 101–02 (1923).
97
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
98
Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S.
425, 433 (1894).
99
Id. at 427.
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observed.100 It applied the patent exhaustion rule, holding that
once the dispenser had been sold the purchaser took that unit
free and clear of any obligation under the patent.101
The patent exhaustion cases also date back to the
1850s.102 This judge-made doctrine, which today is as robust
as ever,103 held that once the patentee had sold a patented
good, it had exhausted its rights in that patent and could not
subsequently enforce license restrictions by a patent infringement suit.104 The exhaustion rule has been applied to a variety
of post-sale restraints, but beginning in the late nineteenth
century many of the cases involved tying—most generally when
a durable patented invention required the use of some single
use or consumable complement which the seller insisted be
purchased only from itself.105
One important difference between the repair/reconstruction distinction and patent exhaustion is that exhaustion applied to a license condition stated at the time the patented good
100

Id. at 433.
Id. at 436.
102
They originated in Bloomer v. McQuewan. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
For different opinions about the doctrine’s origins and rationale see John F. Duffy
& Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1 (2016); Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Exhaustion and Federalism: A Historical Note, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2016).
103
See Impression Prods, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017);
Hovenkamp, supra note 22.
104
Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.), at 542.
105
Important early examples of patent ties raising exhaustion issues include:
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917)
(patent exhaustion precluded enforcement of license condition requiring purchaser of projector to show the patentee’s films); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1, 8–9 (1912) (tie of patented mimeograph machine to paper, stencils and ink);
Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425
(1894) (patented toilet paper dispenser tied to unpatented toilet paper); Aeolian
Co. v. Harry H. Juelg Co., 155 F. 119, 119–20 (2d Cir. 1907) (patented player
piano and music rolls; no exhaustion); Cortelyou v. Lowe, 111 F. 1005, 1005 (2d
Cir. 1901) (per curiam) (patented copying machine and unpatented supplies; no
exhaustion where contributory infringement defendant apparently did not know
he was selling good for an infringing use); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co.
v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 289, 292–93 (6th Cir. 1896) (patented button
fastening machine and staples used for fastening; refusing to find exhaustion);
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co., 172 F. 225, 225–26, 233
(E.D.N.Y. 1909) (patented bottle corking machine and tied corks; refusing to find
exhaustion); A.B. Dick Co. v. Milwaukee Office Specialty Co., 168 F. 930, 930
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1908) (mimeograph machines and stencils; refusing to find exhaustion); Wagner Typewriter Co. v. F.S. Webster Co., 144 F. 405, 407
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (patented typewriter and typewriter ribbons); Brodrick Copygraph Co. v. Roper, 124 F. 1019, 1019 (C.C.D.R.I. 1903) (copying machine and
ink; no exhaustion, but observing that the ink was capable of noninfringing uses
and limiting the injunction to sale of ink actually known by the seller to be
intended for infringement of the patent).
101

R
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was sold. By contrast, the repair/reconstruction distinction
could apply to a patented article, whether or not any condition
was attached. That was true of the combination patent as well.
Patent law’s contributory infringement rule applied when
the patent contemplates that a product and a process are to be
used together, even if the product is unpatented. The defendant then sells the unpatented product, knowing that its intended use will be in combination with the process. Thus the
patent itself imposes tying to the extent it prohibits anyone
except the patentee from selling the product separately from
the process. In Leitch, a New Deal-era case, the Court refused
to find infringement by a seller of an unpatented road-building
material that could be applied only with the patented process.106 The Court found an attempt to extend enforcement
“beyond the scope” of the patent by interpreting it to cover the
unpatented material.107 In 1952, Congress amended the Patent Act, making clear that a sale of the unpatented good would
infringe if it was not capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.108
By contrast, a combination patent was ordinarily given to a
combination of separate devices, some or all of which might be
separately patented. As the Supreme Court defined the term in
Victor Talking Machines: “A combination is a composition of
elements, some of which may be old and others new, or all old
or all new. It is, however, the combination that is the invention,
and is as much a unit in contemplation of law as a single or
non-composite instrument.”109
That decision held that Victor, which owned a combination
patent on a phonograph together with unpatented wax discs on
which music was recorded, had a patent right to insist that a
purchaser of the machine use only discs provided by the patentee itself.110 As Justice McKenna observed, it was the interaction of the stylus in the machine and the impressions in the
106

Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 459 (1938).
Id. at 462 (“[B]eyond the scope of the patentee’s monopoly . . . .”).
108
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2018); see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176 (1980) (interpreting new provision and finding that sale of unpatented chemical that could be applied only by patentee’s method patent constituted contributory infringement).
109
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325, 332 (1909),
overruled by Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). The
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. made it much more
difficult for the creator of a combination patent to show that the new combination
of previously known technologies met the nonobviousness requirement. 550 U.S.
398 (2007).
110
Victor Talking Mach., 213 U.S. at 333–35.
107
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disc that produced the desired sound.111 In this case, the infringement defendant “had made and sold a single element of
the claims of the . . . patent, with the intent that it should be
united to the other element and complete the combination; and
this is infringement[.]”112
The Victor rule effectively authorized the owner of a combination patent to impose tying to the extent that the tying and
tied products were the separate components of a single combination patent. Thirty-five years later in Mercoid, however, the
Court changed its mind, holding that if an element in a combination patent was itself unpatented, then the user had a right
to supply that good for itself.113 To hold otherwise would expand the patent’s coverage beyond its lawful scope to include
unpatented articles.114 In a separate decision issued the same
day, the Court held that the patentee’s insistence that a buyer
take all elements of the combination together from the patentee, including the unpatented element, was unlawful tying
under the antitrust laws.115
Some decisions employed these doctrines in combination.
For example, in Aiken, the court held that the purchaser of a
knitting machine that used needles that wore out frequently
was free to replace the worn-out needles with needles that he
had produced himself.116 First, this replacement constituted a
“repair” of the machine.117 Second, under the patent exhaustion rule the sale of the knitting machine exhausted the patents
contained in that machine and could no longer control the
purchaser’s conduct.118
111

Id. at 335.
Victor Talking Mach., 213 U.S. at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897)
(combination patent covering components of railroad switch; enjoining defendant
from selling one of the unpatented components). Courts had reached this conclusion as early as 1878. Bowker v. Dows, 3 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878) (No.
1734). The combination patent in question required a presumably unpatented
extract taken from unspecified vegetables; the defendant sold the extract, advertising its use in infringement of the patent, and the court approved an injunction.
Id. at 1071–72.
113
Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 665–67.
114
Id. at 665 (“[T]o allow such suits would be to extend the aid of a court of
equity in expanding the patent beyond the legitimate scope of its monopoly.”).
115
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684
(1944) (“The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the anti-trust laws not by the patent law.”).
116
Aiken v. Manchester Print Works,1 F. Cas. 245, 247 (D.N.H. 1865) (No.
113).
117
Id.
118
Id.
112
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These patent tying cases rarely mention competition policy
as such. Their concern is how to determine the appropriate
scope of the patent in order to measure the patentee’s reward.
As such, they were very heavily driven by technological and
design issues pertaining to the life expectancy, separate patentability, or functionality of the individual components that
made a patented article valuable.
B. Tying and Antitrust Law
The emergent theory of patent ties, widely embraced during
the Progressive Era, was that the patentee was trying to expand
its power from the patented primary product, where patent law
rightfully gave it a monopoly, to include a second unpatented
product in which it had no legal monopoly.119
The early antitrust analysis of ties developed in controversy
surrounding the Supreme Court’s Henry v. A.B. Dick decision.120 Writing for the majority, Justice Lurton had taken a
benign position on patent ties, originally formulated in the Button case while he was still a judge on the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.121 In that case, the patentee’s machine used small
metal staples to fasten buttons to newly made garments.122
The staples were loaded into the machine and were used a
single time.123 By a license restriction created on sale of the
machine, the patentee required the staples to be purchased
from the patentee.124 In upholding this restriction, Lurton rejected the argument that the machine–staple tie constituted an
improper enlargement of the monopoly from the machine to the
119
E.g., Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 665–66 (tying of unpatented elements in
combination patent was an attempt to “acquire a monopoly which is not plainly
within the terms of the grant”); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (noting how the tying of patented ice box to unpatentable
dry ice was “[c]ontrol over the supply of such unpatented material [which] is
beyond the scope of the patentee’s monopoly”); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917) (tying of patented projector to
unpatented films was attempt to extend power “wholly without the scope of the
patent monopoly”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the
Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515 (2015) (discussing meaning and effects of “scope
of the patent” doctrine in antitrust law); see also Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1, 70 (1912) (White, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that tying of patented and unpatented goods represented an attempt by the patentee “to increase the scope of the
monopoly granted by a patent”).
120
Henry, 224 U.S. 1.
121
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F.
288, 296 (6th Cir. 1896).
122
Id. at 289.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 290.
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unpatented staples.125 Rather, any monopoly that resulted
from the tie was entirely derivative of the monopoly that resulted from the patent itself.126 He concluded that the tie was
not a producer of monopoly at all but rather a metering device
“by which the royalty proportioned to the actual use of the
machine is determined.”127 A few years later, Justice Lurton
took the same position in Henry, adding that the Sherman Act
was not relevant.128 To the argument that the tie served to
extend the monopoly from the patented machine to the unpatented supplies, Lurton replied that this was nonsense:
The stencil, the paper, and the ink made by the patentee, will
continue to be unpatented. Anyone will be as free to make,
sell, and use like articles as they would be without this restriction, save in one particular—namely, they may not be
sold to a user of one of the patentee’s machines with intent
that they shall be used in violation of the license.129

That statement—obvious to some but heretical to others—
became the focus of a century-long debate over the proper
scope of the patent “monopoly.” To Progressives like Justices
Brandeis and Douglas, and Thurman Arnold’s New Deal Antitrust Division, the patent itself created a “monopoly,” and the
tie extended it beyond its lawful scope to unpatented supplies.130 Justice Lurton’s view ultimately prevailed: there is no
monopoly unless the market creates one.131 Neither the Court
nor the dissenters cited any evidence from the record indicating the extent to which the patent tie foreclosed the supply
market from rivals. Justice Lurton apparently assumed—undoubtedly correctly—that the paper, stencils and ink that actually passed through A.B. Dick’s mimeograph machine
accounted for a tiny percentage of total sales of those products.
Congress did not like the Henry result. Nevertheless, the
language that became § 3 of the Clayton Act seems verbally
consistent with Lurton’s analysis. The statute made it unlawful to sell or lease a patented article on the condition or understanding that the purchaser not deal in the goods of a
125

Id. at 292–93.
See id. at 296 (“Their monopoly in an unpatented article will depend upon
the merit of their patented device, and the extent to which other clinching devices
are superseded by it.”).
127
Id. (“The fasteners are thus made the counters by which the royalty proportioned to the actual use of the machine is determined.”).
128
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31 (1912).
129
Id. at 31–32.
130
Id.
131
Id.
126
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competitor, but only “where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly.”132 That is, it was not enough to show
that the tying article was patented. The challenger also had to
show a harmful impact on competition.
The Supreme Court largely ignored that limitation, even
though it is express in the statute. In the 1930s and after, it
began to fashion rules prohibiting ties under both antitrust law
and the patent “misuse” doctrine but without seriously examining whether there was an impact on competition aside from
the existence of the patent itself. Justice Brandeis’ opinion in
the Carbice case adopted precisely the position that Lurton had
rejected, concluding that a patentee’s requirement that purchasers of its ice box use its dry ice was an attempt to extend
the patent unlawfully.133 As Brandeis characterized it, the patentee was attempting “to employ the patent to secure a limited
monopoly of unpatented material used in applying the invention.”134 By using the oxymoron “limited monopoly” he was
referring to exclusive control of that portion of the dry ice that
was used in the machine. It did not matter that dry ice was
unpatentable and came from an inexhaustible supply of carbon dioxide.135 Brandeis also found support for this view in
the Clayton Act, but without addressing the Act’s express limitation to ties that had a proven anticompetitive effect.136
Acting at the behest of the Department of Justice, the Supreme Court turned this view into an affirmative antitrust
cause of action in its 1947 International Salt case, condemning
a patentee’s tying of ordinary unpatentable salt to its patented
salt injection machine.137 The Court held that monopoly would
be presumed when the tying product was patented, rejecting
the defendant’s argument that under the Sherman Act the tie
must be shown to be unreasonable, or under the Clayton Act
be shown to substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.138 It was enough for the court that the machine was
patented and that the “volume of business affected by these

132

15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018).
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34–35 (1931).
134
Id. at 33–34.
135
See id. at 29 (“The patent in suit is not for solid carbon dioxide. That article
and its properties as a refrigerant have been long known to the public.”).
136
See id. at 34 n.4.
137
Int’l Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396–98 (1947).
138
See id. at 396.
133
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contracts cannot be said to be insignificant.”139 Thus was born
the per se rule against ties.
Tying law has moved significantly since that time, initially
by assessing a serious market power requirement,140 and later
by overruling the International Salt presumption that a patent
itself confers the requisite monopoly.141 As tying has become
better understood, it is increasingly clear that it is not simply a
price restraint. Its principal uses are in furtherance of design
and production. Sometimes it saves costs. For example, in the
Times-Picayune case, classified advertisers were required to advertise simultaneously in the morning and evening editions of a
newspaper, for that way a typesetter could set identical pages
for both editions.142 In Hyde, the hospital’s decision to use a
single firm to provide anesthesiological services was very likely
related to quality control and risk management.143 In any
event, it is difficult to see how a hospital can profit by making
the market for anesthesiological services less competitive. A
hospital, which is vertically related to its providers, generally
profits when individual providers offer the best combination of
high quality care and competitive prices.
The trick in these cases is to determine when tying is a
production decision and when it is merely a scheme for obtaining higher prices by reducing output. Except for a small
number of ties that foreclose competitors, that is almost never
the case.
1. Tying as a Substitute for Firms
Tying law’s most significant departure from patent law occurred when businesses became seriously involved in developing contractual restricted distribution alternatives to the firm.
The development of dedicated dealerships and business
franchising reflected the fact that traditional lines between production and distribution were unravelling.144 Increasingly,
dealers became involved in performing “production” functions,
not mere reselling. In practically every sense, franchisees hold
139

Id.
See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26–29 (1984);
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610, 613 (1977);
10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, ¶ 1733e.
141
See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–45 (2006).
142
See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 596–97, 623
& n.45 (1953); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1982).
143
See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 25 nn.41–42.
144
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970 chs. 7, 12 (2015).
140

R
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themselves out as producing representatives of the franchisor,
so much so that customers typically do not know whether a
franchise location is independently owned or a wholly owned
subsidiary of the supplier.145
Intellectual property rights are usually present in franchise
or dealership tying cases, although mainly in the form of trademarks. These antitrust tying cases are renegade in the sense
that they address economically beneficial, competitively harmless practices, nearly always arising in competitive markets.
Few involve genuine foreclosure. Some cases do find extraction
of profits from downstream firms.146 They do this by setting
the traditional classical production and distribution framework
as the baseline, and then measuring from that. In the traditional framework, a manufacturer produced its product, set the
price, and sold it to an intermediary or dealer, and that was the
end of the matter. The baseline was competition, identified by
marginal cost pricing. In a franchise case, by contrast, the
franchisor not only sells a product but also licenses business
methods, trademarks, perhaps trade secrets and copyrights,
and goodwill. Overcharges on tied products perform a royalty
function, and the aggregate of franchisee or dealer payments
operate as a form of co-investment.147 Given the presence of
intellectual property rights, good will, and metering, prices are
invariably above marginal cost.
Siegel v. Chicken Delight,148 one of the earliest franchise
tying cases, illustrates the issues. Chicken Delight was a
nondominant fast food franchisee with a declining market
share.149 Its franchise fee was zero, but it required franchisees
to purchase certain equipment and food items at an overcharge. The antitrust claim was for the overcharge on these
purchases, trebled.150 The court apparently realized that this
overcharge was in fact a substitute for a royalty, so it remanded
145
Good literature on this subject includes Benjamin Klein, The Economics of
Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9 (1995); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The
Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345 (1985); G.
Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts,
28 J.L. & ECON 503 (1985); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON 223, 227 (1978).
146
See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46 (9th Cir. 1971)
(requiring that franchisees purchase certain products at a mark up from the
franchisor in lieu of a franchise fee).
147
See id. at 52; Klein & Saft, supra note 145, at 348.
148
Siegel, 448 F.2d 43.
149
The court inferred market power from the fact that the franchisor’s name
was trademarked. See id. at 49–50.
150
Id. at 52.

R
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for a determination of what the damages should be.151 Its only
basis for thinking that there would be any damages at all was
that a franchise fee would have been negotiated up front, while
the overcharge was added later to actual purchases and might
have been unknown at the time that the franchise was
negotiated.152
Franchise ties occur because the franchisor is attempting
to achieve the same structure of production that it would obtain through wholly owned subsidiary stores. If a fried chicken
restaurant chain supplied its own cooking equipment, food
items, and paper products to its stores, no one would have
given the practice a second look. And one would expect an
automobile manufacturer that owned its own dealerships to
use its own repair parts. Further, the owner would earn different amounts from different locations depending on their profits
or volume of business. When the individual restaurants or
dealerships are independently owned, however, the same practices are transformed into tying.153 The same thing is true of
so-called “full-line forcing,” a type of tying arrangement in
which dealers are required to handle the full line of the
franchisor’s output.154 The models that the franchisee wants
to sell are the “tying” product, while those it does not want are
the “tied” product.155 By contrast, a manufacturer that owned
its own dealership would naturally want to sell its entire line.
151

Id. at 53.
Id.
153
See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828
F.2d 1033, 1047 (4th Cir. 1987) (Mercedes Benz unlawfully required dealers to
use its own repair parts); Tire Sales Corp. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 637 F.2d 467,
477 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981) (unlawful for nondominant
gasoline station franchisor to require its dealers to purchase its tires, batteries
and automotive accessories); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 47 (5th
Cir. 1976) (nondominant defendant’s “Zuider Zee” seafood restaurants unlawfully
required franchisees to use its restaurant equipment); Collins v. Int’l Dairy
Queen, 939 F. Supp. 875, 882–84 (M.D. Ga. 1996) (Dairy Queen could have
unlawfully tied its franchise to requirement that franchisee purchase cookies in
Blizzard ice cream product from franchisor), overruled on other grounds by Maris
Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 302 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2002).
154
See Menominee Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164, 165 (7th Cir.
1981) (termination of dealer for failure to carry franchisor’s full line of hose couplings might have violated Sherman Act, as well as state law; inferring market
power from patent on the machine that crimped the unpatented couplings to the
hoses).
155
E.g., George Lussier Enters., Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., No. CIV.
C–99–109–B, 1999 WL 1327396, at *6 (D.N.H. Dec. 13, 1999) (refusing to dismiss
claim of unlawful tying where car manufacturer required dealers to take slower
selling models as well as the more desirable ones); cf. Menominee Rubber Co., 657
F.2d at 167 (sustaining preliminary injunction under both state law and federal
152
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Antitrust courts have largely come to realize this, and the
day of the franchise tying arrangement antitrust case may be
over. In particular, the Supreme Court’s Illinois Tool Works
(ITW) case156 precluded the inference of tying product market
power from a patent and, pro tanto, from other IP rights as
well.157 Given that nearly all franchise distribution markets
are competitive, an unlawful tie in such a market would be a
rarity, and there are virtually no cases finding illegality in a
franchise case subsequent to the ITW decision.
2. Metering Ties
a. Uses and Effects
In a metering, or variable proportion, tie the purchaser
uses one unit of a durable tying product, such as a camera or
printer, and must purchase from the same seller its varying
needs of some tied product, such as film or toner cartridges.
Most of the nineteenth century patent cases discussed previously involved variable proportion ties.158 The main portion of
the patented device was a durable good, but various components (needles, wax discs, ink, cutters, ribbons, and the like)
wore out quickly or could be used only once. These needed to
be replaced or restocked in proportion to how intensely the
machine was used.
Variable proportion ties can accomplish several things.
Sometimes they simply meter use of a leased or purchased
device, serving as a substitute for a patent or other IP royalty.159 For example, the inventor of a printer covered by patents might sell the printer at a certain price but install an
electronic counter, charging the user so much per page.160 It
could accomplish the same thing by requiring the purchaser to
antitrust law in favor of dealer terminated because it refused to promote supplier’s
full line of hose fittings).
156
Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
157
See, e.g., Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 530 F.3d 590, 593–95 (7th
Cir. 2008) (under ITW, sufficient market power to support tying claim could not be
inferred from trademark).
158
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 84–89.
159
E.g., Casey v. Diet Center, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1561, 1570 & n.13 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (tie exploited franchisees no more than a “variable royalty based on a
percentage of [the franchisee’s] revenue”).
160
See, e.g., Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., Civil No. 69-654,
1973 WL 856 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 1973) (defendant franchisor of ICEE brand frozen
drinks experimented with electronic meter to count the number of cups); Killian v.
Commissioner, 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 42,036 (U.S. Bd. Tax App. 1942)) (licensor of
production technology used meters on machines to measure output for computation of royalties). Such meters are also used to measure oil and gas royalties by
computing production at the wellhead. See Lang v. Weiss Drilling Co., 70 N.E.3d
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buy its own toner cartridges, at an upcharge equal to the royalty. In both situations, it would earn more from higher volume
users. In other cases, metering ties enable a firm to accomplish through contracting partners what it would ordinarily
accomplish for itself. For example, a restaurant chain that
owned its locations would earn more revenue from higher volume locations. Metering ties enable a firm to accomplish the
same thing through independent franchisees, although it could
also use a license fee based on revenue.
Variable-use royalties are an important inducement to
technology development because they provide larger payoffs as
inventions are more heavily used. This is why per usage patent
royalties have been around for many decades.161 Variable proportion ties perform the same function.
The terms “price discrimination” and “metering” might appear to be synonyms, but they can refer to quite different
things. Price discrimination occurs when a seller earns different rates of return on different sales—or more precisely, when
the sales occur at different ratios of price to marginal cost.162
By contrast, “metering” need not involve price discrimination at
all. In some cases, metering reflects no more than the differential costs that variable use imposes on the seller or lessor.163
For example, suppose that I lease a metal press that costs
precisely 20 cents per stamp to operate. My lease rate is a fixed
fee plus 20 cents per stamp. In that case I am metering but
probably not price discriminating. The variable fee simply covers my costs. By contrast, if use of the device costs me 20 cents
but I charge a usage fee of 30 cents, I will be obtaining a higher
rate of return from higher intensity users. For example, the
pizza franchisor which requires its franchisees to purchase its
own pizza dough at a premium price is not merely metering.
Rather, it is earning a higher rate of return from franchisees
who sell more pizza because they purchase more dough.164
Likewise, the patentee who licenses out a process patent on a
625, 633 (Ohio App. 2016); Sowell v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 604 F. Supp.
371, 373 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
161
See, e.g., Kelly v. Porter, 17 F. 519, 520 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (patent calling
for royalty of $3 per dozen boots manufactured by patentee’s machine).
162
See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 ¶ 721 (defining and discussing
price discrimination).
163
See, e.g., Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.,
77 F. 288, 296 (6th Cir. 1896) (concluding the metering device was used to
determine the royalty proportioned to the actual use of the machine).
164
E.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir.
1997) (unsuccessful challenge to Domino’s requirement that franchisee’s
purchase its pizza dough at a premium price).
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royalty measured by use incurs no per-use costs. Thus it has a
higher rate of return from higher-intensity users.
Nearly all the litigated variable proportion tying cases involve intellectual property rights, most commonly patents or
trademarks.165 The seller typically lowers the price of the tying
product, often below marginal cost and sometimes even to
zero,166 and charges a premium for the tied product. As a
result, the seller earns more from high-volume users who consume more of the tied product.
Most variable-use royalties, including patent royalties, and
discriminatory metering ties result in prices that are higher
than short-run marginal cost.167 As a result, if they are viewed
in a purely static model, they appear to reduce welfare from
some hypothetical competitive norm.168 For example, a 3%
royalty on a process patent or a 10% royalty on a book is
deadweight loss in a static model because the marginal cost to
the rights holder is zero. The book royalty might increase the
cost of the book from $20 to $22 even though the royalty recipient (author) has no marginal costs of production. That price
increase transfers wealth away from those customers who actually buy, and causes deadweight loss with respect to those
customers who choose not to buy at a price of $22.
This example ignores incentive effects, however. The function of both royalties and variable proportion ties is to induce
innovation or entrepreneurial risk taking.169 An IP royalty
seems to harm consumer welfare only if we compare it with a
regime in which producers get access to the same rights at a
price of zero.
165
One possibility that did not involve IP rights is N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States. 356 U.S. 1, 3–8 (1958) (condemning “preferential routing” covenants in
land sales by railway to farmers, requiring latter to ship on defendant’s railroad).
Presumably different farmers shipped different amounts, although the Court did
not discuss the issue; the Court discussed harm entirely in terms of exclusion—in
this case, taking away the farmers’ “freedom to deal with competing carriers.” Id.
at 8.
166
E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46 (9th Cir. 1971) (price
of tying product, the franchise, was zero); see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra
note 23, at 942–43 & n.78 (discussing Coca-Cola’s practice of providing a free
soft-drink dispensing machine to qualifying employers, subject to the condition
that the machine be stocked exclusively with Coca-Cola products).
167
A perfectly calibrated metering tie that did not price discriminate could
reflect marginal cost pricing. For example, if the marginal cost of using the press
is 20 cents per stamp and the patentee charges that amount, the result might be
metering at marginal cost.
168
In a pure patent license, marginal cost is zero, so any positive royalty
would appear to reduce output from marginal cost pricing of the same technology.
169
See infra subsection II.A.3.
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b. Metering Ties and the Nonmonopolist
Ignoring incentive effects, when the seller has a monopoly
in the tying product and the tied product is perfectly competitive, such ties may reduce short-run consumer welfare from
the single monopoly price, at least if they also reduce output of
the durable good.170 However, that result appears to be trivial
across the range of litigated variable proportion tying cases.
The sellers in these cases are virtually never monopolists or
even close. In the Lexmark printer–cartridge tying case that
has gone twice to the Supreme Court,171 printer maker
Lexmark had less than 5% of the fiercely competitive market for
computer printers.172 In Chicken Delight,173 a well-known antitrust case condemning a franchisor’s variable proportion tie,
Chicken Delight was a struggling franchisor fighting a losing
battle against Kentucky Fried Chicken and other fast food restaurants.174 Like many struggling, nondominant franchisors,
Chicken Delight gave its franchise away for free but used a
variable proportion tie with an upcharge on tied products to
obtain its revenue.175 Strategies that are profitable for a
nonmonopolist must have at least one nonmonopolistic
explanation.
By contrast, the patentee in the Motion Picture Patents case
appears to have been a dominant firm, but its metering tie was
170
Einer Elhauge & Barry Nalebuff, The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties, 33
J.L. Econ. & Org. 68, 68–72 (2017) (discussing effects based on a model in which
the tying firm is a monopolist in the tying product and the tied product is perfectly
competitive). The authors also show that on realistic assumptions second degree
price discrimination increases welfare only if it increases output. Id. at 70.
171
Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017);
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
172
See “Weak Demand” for Printers and Cartridges Affects Lexmark, RECYCLER
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.therecycler.com/posts/weak-demand-for-printersand-cartridges-affects-lexmark/ [https://perma.cc/BYV4-BWA2] (Lexmark’s
printer market share estimated as 4.5%).
173
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
174
See William Whitworth, Kentucky-Fried, NEW YORKER (Feb. 14, 1970),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1970/02/14/kentucky-fried [https://per
ma.cc/74W4-6H2K].
175
Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 46–47 (“[Chicken Delight] charged its franchisees no franchise fees or royalties. Instead, in exchange for the license granting the franchisees the right to assume its identity and adopt its business
methods and to prepare and market certain food products under its trade-mark,
Chicken Delight required its franchisees to purchase a specified number of
cookers and fryers and to purchase certain packaging supplies and mixes exclusively from Chicken Delight. The prices fixed for these purchases were higher
than, and included a percentage markup which exceeded that of, comparable
products sold by competing suppliers.”); see also ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE
LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 59 (2005) (noting that most up-front
franchise fees are very low in relation to value of business).
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also exclusionary, intended to drive competing film makers out
of the market or limit their growth.176 That was also true of the
1936 IBM case, where an arguably dominant firm tied computer tabulating cards to its computer leases, but the tying was
addressed as an exclusionary practice directed against rivals in
the card market.177 Variable proportion technology ties, discussed at greater length below,178 are more difficult to classify,
but they are always challenged as exclusionary practices.
One example of a technological variable proportion tie imposed by a dominant firm is the Kodak Instamatic/film cartridge combination, which was the subject of the Berkey Photo
litigation.179 Kodak’s simultaneous introduction of a new miniaturized camera and sealed film cartridges that worked only
with each other very likely enabled Kodak to earn higher returns from high-intensity users.180 At the same time, however,
the camera/film package was a substantial technological advance, and the only way to open up the tie would have been for
Kodak to relinquish its intellectual property rights in either the
camera or the film cartridges. In any event, the alleged harm
was foreclosure of a competitor, the plaintiff Berkey Photo.
Berkey Photo illustrates some of the assessment problems
that arise when innovative products that incorporate technological ties are introduced. If we argue that this particular
metering tie reduces welfare, the question is: In reference to
what? The previous technology, which was the old-fashioned
Brownie camera with rolled film? Hardly, or customers would
not have substituted away from it in droves.181 So, the argument must be that we want to permit Kodak to innovate the
new camera/film combination, but we want it to obtain less
revenue from customers than the variable proportion tie enabled it to do. One way to do that might be to permit Kodak to
set a single price on the camera, though force the film to be sold
176
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917);
see infra note 187.
177
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139 (1936). The Court made no
attempt to compute IBM’s market share for either computers or cards, but it
referred to IBM frequently as having a “monopoly” in the computers simply because it owned patents. Further, the action had been brought not only against
IBM, but also against its competitor Remington Rand. See United States v. IBM
Corp., 13 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). The district court also predicted that,
given that the cards themselves were unpatented, enjoining the tie would increase
competition in the cards. Id. at 20.
178
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 190–91.
179
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
180
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, § 10.6e.
181
See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 269 (describing success of Instamatic camera/film package).
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at marginal cost. That would turn Kodak into a single-price
monopolist, but it would also involve an antitrust court in price
regulation of a kind that it has always avoided.
Alternatively, we might do what plaintiff Berkey Photo requested, which is to force Kodak to pre-disclose its technology
in order to give rivals a head start, perhaps with the result that
the film would be sold in a competitive market.182 It is hard to
come up with a remedy more hostile toward innovation than
that one, and the Second Circuit was wise to reject it as a
matter of law.183 For example, assuming it took a copyist two
years to invent around Kodak’s patents, a two year pre-disclosure requirement could deprive Kodak of its entire innovation
investment by forcing its returns down to the competitive level.
Of course, the court might pick a shorter pre-disclosure period—say one year. This would force Kodak to share some but
not all of its returns. That would involve an antitrust court—
with no statutory warrant—to get involved in regulating the
proper return to innovation, and in a situation where the result
would be highly speculative at best.
The dominant explanation for metering or variable proportion ties is that they can increase output because the seller
lowers the price of the tying product, enabling more purchasers
to buy.184 It then increases the price of the tied product. For
buyers who would not be in the market at all at the standalone
price,185 the tie is an unambiguous gain. For buyers who
would have been in the market anyway, individual welfare depends on intensity of use.186 Lower volumes users come out
ahead because the increased price they pay for the tied good is
more than offset by the price reduction in the tying good.
Higher volumes users lose out unless they are able to predict in
advance that their costs will be higher. In that case, they will
switch to an alternative if one is available.
That is why monopoly power in the tying product is essential for consumer harm. Otherwise, any purchaser who would
be worse off under the tie would substitute to a different seller.
To illustrate, suppose the seller of a durable printer cuts the
price by $100 below the competitive level but ties cartridges at
182

See id. at 279–82.
Id. at 279–84 (discussing and rejecting pre-disclosure requirement). The
trial judge had permitted the jury to decide whether refusal to pre-disclose was
unlawful if it made “it impossible for a competitor to compete with Kodak,” and the
jury found for Berkey Photo. Id. at 281.
184
See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, §§ 10.6e, 11.3c.
185
That is, the price if the seller were prohibited from tying.
186
See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, §§ 10.6e, 11.3c.
183
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an upcharge of $10 each. The customer who would not be in
the market at the old price but who buys at the lower price
experiences a clear gain. The seller gains as well from sales to
this customer, provided that the combined printer–cartridge
price is profitable. Ignoring the time value of money, the
printer user who knows that she will use fewer than ten cartridges will also gain, knowing that the printer discount more
than offsets the increased cartridge costs. By contrast, the
printer user who knows in advance that she will use more than
ten cartridges during the relevant time period will purchase
from a competitor whose printer accepts generic cartridges. If
the printer seller is not a monopolist and the printer makers
are not colluding, this substitution will occur. The nonmonopolist printer seller would lose all of these high-intensity customers to rivals.
The vast majority of variable proportion ties are imposed by
nonmonopolists. In that case, their source of profit cannot be
sales that harm high volume users, for these will have substituted to a competitor. Rather, the nonmonopolist’s source of
profit results from the price cut in the tying product that induces more people to purchase the tying product. If the tying
product is competitive, no class of consumers is harmed.
c. Metering Ties, Antitrust Policy, and the Design of
Production
Should variable proportion ties ever be condemned?
Never, if the defendant is not a monopolist in the tying product
market. Perhaps, if the defendant is a monopolist and the tie
forecloses rivals unreasonably. That was very likely the case of
the Motion Picture Patents tie, in which the patentee used a
projector–film tie as part of an attempt to control the infant
American film market.187 Most of the variable proportion tying
cases do not foreclose anyone because no monopoly exists in
the tying product and the tied products are common
commodities.
For nonforeclosing ties addressed under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the tie is lawful unless it restrains trade.188 That
would require, first, that the firm have significant market
187
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
On the monopolistic story of Motion Picture Patents Co., see MICHAEL CONANT,
ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 16–21
(1960); BENJAMIN B. HAMPTON, A HISTORY OF THE MOVIES (THE LITERATURE OF CINEMA)
8–11, 17–24, 34, 64–76, 79–81 (1931); LEWIS JACOBS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN
FILM: A CRITICAL HISTORY, 1921–1947, at 81–85, 88, 164–65, 291–92 (1968).
188
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
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power in the tying market.189 Second, once a monopolist is
found, it would have to be shown that the tie actually impaired
competition.190 While such a case might be possible, I am
unaware of any among numerous variable proportion tying
cases in which these two requirements have been proven.
More fundamentally, the argument against variable proportion ties is a misconceived venture that treats a practice
that is really a design or production choice as a price restraint.
To the extent that variable proportion ties involve goods that
are protected by IP rights, the variable proportion tie is an
important—and quite ordinary—device for incentivizing development in that particular market. That is why we have royalties on IP rights in the first place.191 In the franchise and other
restricted dealership cases, variable proportion ties are ways of
incentivizing developing by reducing the costs of franchisee or
dealer entry and enabling both the franchisor and the franchisee to profit from higher sales. The principal lesson here is
that the metering tie should be viewed as a design or production tool, not as a constraint on pricing.
3. Technological Ties: Direct Attacks on Innovation
A technological tie, or “tech tie” occurs when two products
are bound together by technological design rather than contract.192 As a result, at least in the straightforward case, the
creation of a tech tie is a unilateral act that is not covered by § 1
of the Sherman Act or § 3 of the Clayton Act.193 It must be
addressed as monopolization or attempt to monopolize under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.194 This also entails that the practice
can be condemned only if it is “exclusionary.” Because a firm
acting unilaterally can set any price it pleases, mere extraction
of higher prices does not violate § 2.195
Tech ties can come in both variable and fixed proportion. A
good example of a variable proportion tech tie is Berkey Photo,
189
Elhauge & Nalebuff apparently agree. See Elhauge & Nalebuff, supra note
170, at 33 (assuming a monopolist in the tying product).
190
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 ¶ 1729 (forthcoming).
191
Elhauge & Nalebuff recognize that patents increase innovation incentives
and at one point suggest the possibility of time-limited variable proportion ties. In
the case of a patent, the lifetime is twenty years or less, but copyrights typically
last a century and trademarks never expire. Elhauge & Nalebuff, supra note 170,
at 34.
192
See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP supra note 29 ¶¶ 776–77 (on technology ties).
193
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018).
194
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
195
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP supra note 29, ¶ 720. On technology ties as
Sherman § 2 violations, see 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29.
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where Kodak simultaneously introduced a revolutionary camera design, the Pocket Instamatic, along with sealed film cartridges.196 Both the camera and the cartridges were protected
by patents and would work only with each other. As a result,
for some period of time someone using the camera had to use
Kodak’s film as well, but the proportion varied depending on
how many photos that person made. As a result, the purpose
of the tie was very likely price discrimination or metering.197
An example of a fixed proportion tech tie is Microsoft’s
“commingling” of the code for its Internet Explorer browser into
the Windows computer operating system.198 Once the browser
code had been written into the Windows operating system,
someone could purchase a copy of Windows only by purchasing Internet Explorer as well. In that case, the anticompetitive
purpose of commingling was exclusion, targeting Netscape,
which was a rival in the browser market.199 The tie was fixed
proportion because one copy of Windows invariably included
one copy of Internet Explorer.
Tech ties have become by far the most important vehicle for
direct antitrust attacks on innovation. The typical plaintiff,
such as Berkey, is a manufacturer of a complementary product
claiming that its own product was excluded from the market by
means of the defendant’s redesign. The tortured history of antitrust litigation against IBM in the 1970s and 1980s also argued that by pulling various components into a single,
miniaturized box, IBM destroyed the market for old-style, individually sold peripheral products.200
196
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); see
discussion supra text accompanying notes 179–86.
197
See generally Elhauge & Nalebluff, supra note 170, at 69–74 (2016) (discussing metering, price discrimination, and ties).
198
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64–65 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
199
Id. at 64 (observing that commingling prevented computer manufacturers
(OEMs) “from pre-installing other browsers and deterred consumers from using
them”).
200
See, e.g., Transamerica Comput. Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983)
(company in business of purchasing peripheral equipment suing IBM); Memorex
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (disk storage
device manufacturer bringing suit against IBM), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981);
Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (manufacturer of
hearing aids and audio equipment suing IBM), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975). The parent of these cases was In re IBM Corp., which the government
voluntarily dismissed after thirteen years of litigation. See 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.
1982) (noting dismissal by stipulation). For a recap by a critic, see John E.
Lopatka, United States v. IBM: A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145
(2000). For an analysis by IBM’s principal economic expert, see FISHER, MCGOWAN
& GREENWOOD, supra note 86.
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Few plaintiffs have been so brazen as to argue that antitrust should condemn an innovation simply because the innovated product was more desirable to consumers and thus took
sales away from competitors committed to older technology.
Rather, competitors have made other arguments. One, considered and wisely rejected in Berkey Photo, was that the developer of market-shifting technology had a duty to pre-disclose it
to rivals so that they could prepare themselves.201
Another rejected claim was, in essence, of predatory pricing. IBM introduced new, smaller models of its computers at a
price significantly lower than that of previous technology.202
Looking at the production costs of the new line, the prices were
above all relevant measures of cost. However, the plaintiff argued that IBM introduced the new computers while there was
still commercial life remaining in the old line, and that the
foregone profits on the old line—which it characterized as “impact costs”—should also be considered in computing IBM’s
costs on the new line.203 The district court concluded that
including such “impact costs” in the cost of a new product
would operate as a “disincentive to research and innovation,”
essentially forcing dominant firms to continue to sell an existing product as long as it had commercial life remaining.204
Finally, the plaintiff in Allied Orthopedic, which involved a
medical device, made an unsuccessful “welfare tradeoff” argument.205 It urged that to the extent the introduction of new
technology harmed those committed to the previous technology, the incremental costs of this harm should be balanced
against the incremental benefit produced by the innovation.
201

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 179–86.
Transamerica Comput. Co. v. IBM, 459 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
aff’d, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
203
See Transamerica Comput. Co., 459 F. Supp. at 631.
204
Id. at 631. As the district court characterized and concluded:
For example, the introduction of a popular and revolutionary new
tape device may give rise to impact costs (reductions in anticipated
profits) as the result of the withdrawal from production of an outmoded tape device, and also impact costs that result from customers
switching from older but continued tape devices to the newer model.
Again [the plaintiff] would take these costs beyond the planning
stage and subtract them from the new product’s profits in determining whether the price set was predatory and below cost. Such a rule
of law would be a disincentive to research and innovation, and has
all the drawbacks that calculation of opportunity costs would impose. Neither opportunity nor impact costs (as defined here) may be
included in determining whether a price is predatory.
Id. at 631–32.
205
Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d
991 (9th Cir. 2010).
202
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The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument categorically and as a
matter of law.206 Rather, the court held, if the innovation was a
genuine product improvement then there would be no basis for
“balancing,” and thus no antitrust liability.207
One exception, acknowledged but not often found, is the
technological change that is not an improvement at all but was
adopted exclusively because it made a rival’s complementary
product incompatible. In C.R. Bard, the Federal Circuit approved a jury verdict to that effect.208 The antitrust defendant
had a dominant position in a durable medical skin sample gun,
which used single-use needles to capture small pieces of skin
from patients for laboratory study. The needles were generic
and supplied by the defendant, the plaintiff, and others. The
defendant then re-engineered the collar fastening the needle to
the gun, with a patented connector that served to make the
plaintiff’s needles incompatible with the gun, thus giving the
defendant the entire market for the needles as well.209 The jury
found that the re-engineered collar was not a technological
improvement at all, but was created only to make the plaintiff’s
needles incompatible.210
Consistent with both Allied Orthopedic and C.R. Bard, in
the Apple iTunes case, the jury was asked if Apple’s modifications to its software that made rivals’ devices incompatible had
a legitimate technological purpose.211 The plaintiff had argued
that Apple’s repeated modifications of its iTunes software rendered non-Apple devices incompatible with the iTunes
database. Apple defended by arguing that the modifications
206
See id. at 1000 (“There is no room in this analysis for balancing the benefits
or worth of a product improvement against its anticompetitive effects. If a monopolist’s design change is an improvement, it is ‘necessarily tolerated by the antitrust laws,’ unless the monopolist abuses or leverages its monopoly power in
some other way when introducing the product. To hold otherwise ‘would be
contrary to the very purpose of the antitrust laws, which is, after all, to foster and
ensure competition on the merits.’ ‘Antitrust scholars have long recognized the
undesirability of having courts oversee product design, and any dampening of
technological innovation would be at cross-purposes with antitrust law.’” (citations omitted)).
207
Id.
208
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999); see also Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis. Int’l, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that a Xerox rival stated a claim of frivolous, exclusionary design for solid printer ink). Other cases are discussed in 3B
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, ¶ 777b.
209
C.R. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1346–48.
210
Id. at 1346.
211
See Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., No. 05–CV–0037 YGR, 2014 WL
4809288 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2014) (granting summary judgment in Apple’s favor
on any redesign conceded to be a genuine product improvement).
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were necessary to deal with evolving security issues. When the
jury affirmatively answered that the modifications were genuine improvements, the complaint was dismissed.212
The iTunes case raises an interesting question, however,
about whether there should be a “software exception” to the
general rules giving virtual carte blanche to design changes.
One reason for extreme deference to product design changes is
that they are usually both costly and risky, and we do not want
to use antitrust law to destroy the incentive to innovate.213
Software may be different, however, because a code change
that makes a competitor’s complementary product worthless
might not involve very much in the way of cost or risk at all.214
For example, the D.C. Circuit condemned Microsoft’s “commingling” of operating system and browser code into a single
program, concluding that the combination did not improve
functionality, but did serve to exclude rival browser
Netscape.215
The judicially manageable software case would be the one
analogous to C.R. Bard, were the jury found that the product
redesign was never intended to be an improvement but was
adapted simply to make rival complementary products incompatible.216 But what about the iTunes case, where the jury
found that Apple’s software designs were in fact improvements
and the court then found for the defendant?217 Cases such as
those raise the possibility of extremely minor improvements
effected through changes in a few lines of code, but doing considerable harm to rivals and perhaps consumers by creating
incompatibilities.
Here, there is much to be said for the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that courts are poorly equipped to “balance” innovation
212
See Brian X. Chen, Apple Wins Decade-Old Class–Action Suit Over iTunes
Updates, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014, at B2 (noting jury instruction on “genuine
[product] improvement”).
213
See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681 (2012).
214
For a good explication, see id. at 705–06. See also Suzanne Van Arsdale &
Cody Venzke, Note, Predatory Innovation in Software Markets, 29 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 243, 247–49 (2015) (describing recent examples of technology companies
changing their code to harm competitors).
215
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64–66 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(condemning commingling of operating system and internet browser code under
§ 2 of Sherman Act).
216
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 208–11.
217
Karen Gullo & Robert Burnson, Jury Returns Verdict for Apple in $1 Billion
iPod Antitrust Class Action, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 26, 2014) (original hyperlink omitted) [https://perma.cc/H2SZ-T7FR].
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improvements against competitive harm.218 Antitrust’s rule of
reason can address the issue, however, without the need to
balance, at least in all but a few cases. The difficult decisions
will be those finding both a genuine improvement from the
innovation and creation of incompatibility with rivals’ products. At that point, however, antitrust policy still rightfully
insists on a query into “less restrictive alternatives.”219 The
fact finder must make sure that the incompatibility is reasonably essential to the product improvement.220 Rewriting a few
lines of code that makes a rival’s device incompatible may be a
product improvement, but perhaps the same improvement
could have been achieved without creating the incompatibility.
That question may not be easy to answer, although it is subject
to expert testimony. Most importantly, however, is that the
existence of such a rule should give dominant firms an ex ante
incentive to redesign in a way that achieves their declared goals
without creating greater incompatibilities than are necessary.
III
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS—DISTINGUISHING DISTRIBUTION
FROM PRODUCTION
Agreements among competitors is another class of restraints where distinguishing production from distribution is
vital. Although they have not been classified as such, naked
cartels are actually restraints on distribution. They have nothing to do with design, development, or production. Rather,
they are agreements about the volume to be produced of a
completed good or the price at which it will be sold. While the
Supreme Court has mischaracterized some agreements, it has
generally held that if the only thing an agreement does is provide collaborative selection of the “correct” price, it is unlawful
per se.
For example, in the Gilded Age railroad–cartel cases, which
were the first antitrust cases that the Supreme Court decided
on the merits,221 the defendants raised “ruinous competition”
218
Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d
991, 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2010).
219
See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 927, 937 (2016).
220
See Hovenkamp, supra note 77.
221
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). The Supreme Court’s first
Sherman Act case was United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), but it
did not reach the merits. Rather, the Court held that the restraint in question was
out of reach of Congress’ Commerce power. Id. at 17–18.
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as a defense. The argument was a popular one at the time,
supported by the economic theory of the day.222 Many economists and critics of the antitrust laws believed that competition
would not work in industries with high fixed costs. Prices
would be driven to marginal cost, which is too low to support
recovery of fixed-cost investment. As a result, firms would
compete themselves into bankruptcy until only one remained.
Justice Peckham’s conclusion that the language of the Sherman Act reaches “every” restraint, and not just unreasonable
restraints, eliminated the ruinous competition defense.223
Eventually, the ruinous competition argument was theorized away for all but a few cases of natural monopoly.224 In
any event, a serious deficiency of the ruinous competition defense was the belief that it justified competitor price fixing.225
If ruinous competition forced prices to too low a level, collusion
would make them too high. That is, price fixers would not
charge the competitive price necessary to maintain investment
and production in the industry. Rather, they would charge the
monopoly price. Even where ruinous competition exists, it
does not justify pricing at monopoly levels.
Cartel pricing is an inferior solution for the ruinous competition problem for another reason. Ruinous competition usually results from significant economies of scale.226 Price fixing
generates the collectively maximizing price among several inefficiently small firms, which will be both higher and costlier to
administer than simple single-firm monopoly pricing. For example, a cartel of five inefficiently small firms will maximize at a
higher price than a lower cost single-firm monopolist in the
same market. From the standpoint of pure production, it is
222
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, ch. 23
(1991).
223
Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 340 (rejecting argument that Sherman Act
prohibits only unreasonable restraints).
224
In such works as JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923); and EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933). See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis:
1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 329–30, 338 (2009).
225
See Hovenkamp, supra note 222, at 341.
226
Economists and lawyers already understood the link by the 1930s. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 123 (1989); Edward S. Mason, Price and Production
Policies of Large-Scale Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 61, 71 (1939); Louis L. Jaffe
& Matthew O. Tobriner, The Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1164, 1164–65 (1932); see also George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost
and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201
(1982) (arguing that high fixed costs forced firms to merger in order to prevent
ruinous competition).
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better to permit the firms to compete until only one remains.
Further, the monopoly outcome is not inevitable. Firms who
find ways to differentiate their products may be able to survive
and offer some competition to the dominant firm.
Today, many price-affecting agreements among competitors are addressed under antitrust law’s rule of reason, which
means that they will be condemned only if the plaintiff can
prove market power and anticompetitive effects.227 This occurs
when the court believes that a price fix is really not a restraint
on distribution at all but rather an agreement that facilitates
development or production.
Properly designed antitrust pleading and discovery is essential for distinguishing production arrangements from price
restraints. Effective pleading rules force plaintiffs to be precise
about why a particular agreement is unlawful and defendants
to be precise about why it is not. Once an antitrust complaint
properly alleges price fixing, the onus is on the defendants
(assuming that they are not disputing the facts) to explain: (1)
why the challenged agreement facilitates development and (2)
why the price fix is essential to this function.228
Supreme Court antitrust cases are filled with instances in
which defendants raised an improper defense. These include
“ruinous competition” in the railroad cases,229 the Professional
Engineers defense that excessive price competition would force
engineers to cut corners,230 and the NCAA’s defense that a
restraint on televised college football games would bolster live
game attendance.231 These defenses are fundamentally arguments that cartel prices are necessary to preserve the right
amount of competition in the industry. Importantly, they require market dominance in order to be effective. That is,
neither the Professional Engineers restraint nor the NCAA restraint would work unless those participating in the agreement
controlled a dominant share of a relevant market. By contrast,
a defense related to improved innovation or production works
even for nondominant groups. Indeed, it works better because
227
E.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (approving joint venture of
two refiners that fixed the price of their output); Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756 (1999) (approving price advertising restraints by professional association); see 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, ch. 15.
228
See Hovenkamp, supra note 222, at 20.
229
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 224–29.
230
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 682–84, 693–94
(1978).
231
Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Assoc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 116–17 (1984).
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nondominant ventures have more to gain from practices that
reduce their costs or improve their products.
In the railroad cases, the companies had simply articulated
the wrong defense. That may not be surprising given that at
the time there was no history of federal antitrust law regarding
price fixing. They were writing on a clean slate. In fact, the
challenged railroad agreements were actually production joint
ventures. The Interstate Commerce Commission supported
them, and the Eighth Circuit had approved them, following the
ICC’s conclusions.232 The participants were state-chartered
railroads who, by law, could operate under their own authority
only in the state where they were chartered. As a result, any
freight that was shipped in one state for delivery in a different
state had to be handled by two or more railroads. The freight
associations addressed this problem by coordinating their
scheduling so as to facilitate transfers from one railroad to
another. Further, for multistate shipments, the rate would
have to be computed and collected either at the shipping point
or the delivery point, and without computers.233 So the agent
had to make the calculations with a pencil. As the Eighth
Circuit observed:
The fact that the business of railway companies is irretrievably interwoven, that they interchange cars and traffic, that
they act as agents for each other in the delivery and receipt of
freight and in paying and collecting freight charges, and that
commodities received for transportation generally pass
through the hands of several carriers, renders it of vital importance to the public that uniform rules and regulations
governing railway traffic should be framed by those who have
a practical acquaintance with the subject, and that they
should be promulgated and faithfully observed.234

To be sure, we might debate whether fixing of rates was the
only workable way of addressing the rate computation problem, but that would simply make it grist for treatment under
232
Accord United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); see United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 58 F. 58, 75–76 (8th Cir. 1893) (relying on
Interstate Commerce Commission Annual Report 25 (1889)), rev’d, 166 U.S. 290
(1897); see also 12 ICC ANN. REP. 10–16 (1899) (approving of joint running arrangements). Ruinous competition was also raised and rejected as a defense in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 85 F. 271, 273–75, 288–89 (6th Cir.
1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
233
Then Associate Justice White (joined by Field, Gray and Shiras, jj.) observed some of these things in his dissent. See Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at
363–65. Justice White would have upheld the agreement as authorized by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. See id. at 343–47.
234
Trans-Missouri, 58 F. at 79–80.
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antitrust’s rule of reason. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit’s
assessment of the freight associations was factually more accurate than that of the Supreme Court. Given the state of corporate law, the associations contributed greatly to the creation of
an interstate railroad system.
The ruinous competition defense to price fixing has occasionally reappeared in Sherman Act price fixing cases, nearly
always to be rejected.235 Most recently it was rejected as a
defense in the Apple e-Books price fixing case.236 At Apple’s
behest, several publishers agreed with each other to impose
higher resale prices for electronic books on Amazon, largely to
facilitate Apple’s entry into the e-book market as an Amazon
competitor. Like Trans-Missouri,237 the e-Books case illustrates the difference between a distribution restraint and a production agreement, except in this case the defendants
needlessly chose a restraint on distribution, which was illegal
per se.
Historically, book publishing and sales have never been a
major source of antitrust controversy. There is a long history of
RPM in distribution, very likely at the behest of smaller retailers seeking protection from larger retail chains.238 The industry has never had a dominant firm and is characterized by a
mixture of very large and very small publishers.
Although the “ruinous competition” defense was raised in
the Apple e-Books case,239 that decision is only superficially
similar to the railroad cases, Addyston Pipe, or the other early
ruinous competition decisions.240 One difference between Apple e-Books and the earlier ruinous competition decisions is
235
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22
(1940) (rejecting ruinous competition defense to output allocation scheme); Pa.
Water & Power Co. v. Consol. Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552, 558–59
(4th Cir. 1950) (rejecting ruinous competition defense to output limitation agreement); Law v. NCAA, 185 F.R.D. 324, 337 (D. Kan. 1999) (jury instruction rejecting ruinous competition defense in challenge to agreement of salary fixing of
basketball coaches); Gen. Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp.
1244, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (rejecting ruinous competition defense to motion
picture split (market division) agreement). A state court did approve a ruinous
competition defense in a merger case. See Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 56
N.Y.S. 288, 290–91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1899) (accepting defense that a
merger was necessary to prevent ruinous competition between two gas
companies).
236
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied.,
136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016).
237
166 U.S. 290 (1897).
238
See Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 438.
239
Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 332; see United States v. Apple, Inc., 889
F. Supp. 2d 623, 642 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
240
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 226, 232.
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that books are subject to extreme product differentiation. As a
result, consumers are not indifferent to everything except
price, and pricing at above marginal cost can remain profitable
even under fairly intense competition. At the same time, however, the book market was and is still going through significant
changes brought about by changing technologies of book
production.
Traditional book publishing is an industry characterized
by some fixed costs (production plant and equipment, for example) and many variable costs, including royalties to authors,
shipping, inventorying, and other distribution costs. There
were also some “intermediate” costs that are more difficult to
classify. For example, type-setting is a fixed cost with respect
to one particular imprint of a single title. It needs to be done
once whether that particular book sells ten or ten million copies. However, different titles must each be individually type
set. As a result, these costs rise as a publisher sells more
different titles, though not as it sells more identical copies of
the same title. None of this has ever proven to be a particularly
significant antitrust problem.
The rise of the e-book dramatically changed the cost structure of the industry—a proposition that too many critics fail to
recognize. Once a title has been type set into an electronic file,
distribution costs drop to virtually zero. Ordering an e-book
from an online seller means that a copy of the electronic file is
sent electronically to the purchaser. No inventory is depleted.
There are no carrying costs for that particular copy other than
the negligible cost of electronic transmission and order
processing. As a result, the short-run profit maximizing price
of that copy is something very close to zero, excluding royalties.
One significant variable cost item for e-books that are still
under copyright is authors’ royalties, which typically are a stipulated percentage of net proceeds. For example, if a book produces proceeds of $20 and the author is entitled to 15%, she
will receive $3 on that particular sale. If the publisher shifts
sales to an electronic format and charges only $10, however,
then the author will receive only $1.50 unless the contract
makes special provision for electronic sales. Small wonder that
authors’ groups are unhappy with the e-book and want existing contracts renegotiated and new contracts written that
will change the way authors are compensated for e-book
sales.241
241
See, e.g., Half of Net Proceeds is the Fair Royalty Rate for E-Books, AUTHORS
GUILD (July 9, 2015), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/half-of-
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The e-book case produced a great deal of hand wringing to
the effect that the court incorrectly identified Amazon as the
wrong “victim.” Basically, Apple wanted to make a dramatic
expansion into the e-books market simultaneously with its introduction of the iPad, which it wished to market as an e-book
reader. At the time, Amazon was selling electronic books at
very low prices, often $9.99 for a book that might sell for $30 or
$40 in a traditional format, and Apple believed its entry would
be unprofitable at that price point.242 As a result, it proposed a
cartel that served the interests of everyone except consumers
and Amazon—the publishers would agree with each other to
impose higher resale prices on Amazon. That cartel would, of
course, be more profitable to publishers and presumably to
authors.
The district court and Second Circuit were correct to condemn the agreement, for several reasons. First, to permit such
a cartel would constitute a precipitous reaction to a change in
technology whose implications were not yet clear. Second, although ruinous competition might explain the motivation for
many firms in high fixed-cost industries to form cartels,243 it is
never the correct solution. Most importantly, the cartel price is
just as “wrong” as the competitive price. Cartels, just as any
other economic actors, set prices to maximize. They will not fix
at the minimum price level to provide competitive returns to
the industry, but rather at the monopoly price, reflecting
whatever degree of market power the cartel members collectively enjoy.244
Third, as noted earlier, the e-Books case was never a good
candidate for a ruinous competition defense even if there was
one. The industry is heavily product differentiated. As a result, the ordinary forces of competition cannot be expected to
drive prices to short-run marginal cost.
The moral of the e-Books litigation is that the publishers
should have chosen a production restraint rather than a distribution restraint. For example, rather than simply fixing e-book
prices, they could have addressed all of their problems by
opening their own joint website for the distribution of electronic
books, perhaps with Apple or other device manufacturers as a
net-proceeds-is-the-fair-royalty-rate-for-e-books/ [https://perma.cc/VEU6SAP5] (urging contracts calling for half of net proceeds to the author).
242
See Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 627–29.
243
On this particular cartel, see Michael Wolfe, The Apple E-Book Agreement
and Ruinous Competition: Are E-Goods Different for Antitrust Purposes?, 12 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 129, 130–31 (2014).
244
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 224–30.
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partner. Each publisher could have set its own prices, and
customers could download individual titles from a common
website into as many file formats as they wished. Each publisher acting individually would be able to set its own download
prices.245
Three other important Supreme Court antitrust decisions
illustrate the difference between horizontal agreements on distribution and agreements about production. In Topco, the Supreme Court improperly characterized a clear production
agreement as a distribution restraint.246 The participants were
relatively small grocery chains whose market shares averaged
about 6% in the territories in which they operated.247 Under
the agreement, they jointly developed the “Topco” brand, built
warehouses and other distribution facilities, all in an effort to
compete more effectively with larger, wholly owned chain
stores. As part of this agreement, each member received an
exclusive assigned territory for the sale of Topco brands, although it was free to sell goods not bearing the Topco label
anywhere it wished.
Without any serious economic analysis, the majority held
that the agreement was unlawful per se because it limited the
members’ ability to compete with each other.248 The fact is that
the Topco venture was doing exactly what any value-maximizing single entity would have done. For example, Wal-Mart
would not build three stores in the same block. Rather, it
would seek optimal dispersion so that the stores could compete
more effectively with competitors and would not end up cannibalizing one another. The Topco defendants were not fixing
prices—they lacked the power to do so. Rather, they were developing a common brand—in the process innovating a new
production mechanism that, if successful, would result in more
effective competition with larger rivals.249
The Broadcast Music (BMI) decision, which involved digital
rights, was an antitrust challenge to a production arrangement
whose social benefits today seem beyond question.250 BMI and
245
Since 2007, RPM has been governed by the rule of reason and is presumably lawful for nondominant firms. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). In any event, however, a price restraint on an IP
license was never unlawful per se to begin with because there is no qualifying
“resale.” See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 ¶¶ 1621–22.
246
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
247
Id. at 599 (noting that the members’ market shares ranged from 1.5% to
16%, with an average of about 6%).
248
See id. at 610–11.
249
See id.
250
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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its fellow association ASCAP (American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers) were associations made up of
thousands of composers, publishers, and others who owned
the copyrights (performance rights) to recorded music. Today,
BMI has approximately 750,000 members,251 and ASCAP has
around 625,000 members.252
BMI and ASCAP issued a “blanket license” in order to confront a problem that had arisen in the recorded music industry—namely, how to license music broadcasting rights to radio
stations, television stations, and others in situations where the
volume of songs to be licensed was both very high and “on
demand,” in the sense that the right had to be granted on very
short notice. A system in which each radio station programmer
or disc jockey negotiated individually for each piece to be
played on a radio station would make music channels as we
know them today impossible.
The BMI and ASCAP blanket licenses consist of tens of
thousands of recorded musical performances for which participating artists and other copyright holders have previously
granted a nonexclusive license.253 These licenses are then
packaged into a “blanket license” which is sold to individual
licensees such as radio stations, at a price which varies with
their revenue. The license gives the licensee immediate, indemnified access to any song in the library. For example, the
disk jockey who is requested to play a particular song will
either know from memory whether it is in the blanket license or
else be able to look it up very quickly on a digital directory. At
that point, he or she need do nothing further to complete any
“transaction.” If the station owns the CD or the recording in
some other form, it can be played on the air.
The Supreme Court decision approving the blanket license
assumed that its composition was a form of horizontal price
fixing.254 That characterization seems doubtful. There is nothing to suggest that the tens of thousands of artists were negotiating with each other about license fees. Rather, they dealt
individually with the administrators of the blanket license.
251
See BMI, https://www.BMI.com [https://perma.cc/HRX3-7F8M] (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
252
See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS, https://
www.ascap.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/7VTE-4F5L] (last visited Apr. 17,
2018).
253
See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 5.
254
The Court acknowledged that “the blanket license cannot be wholly
equated with a simple horizontal arrangement,” but analogized is features to
horizontal price fixing. See id. at 23–24.
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That is, this was not a horizontal agreement but rather a series
of vertical agreements. It is more equivalent to Whole Foods’
announcement that it is willing to pay 50 cents per pound for
organic potatoes. If ten growers deliver potatoes at that price, it
does not suggest horizontal price fixing but rather a series of
vertical agreements that all end up at the same price because
there is a common buyer.255
The BMI blanket license was a production agreement, not a
price agreement. In fact, in this case it produced a product
that was very much different from any product that each individual artist was capable of purchasing alone. The fact that the
artists numbered in the thousands and that the individual licenses were nonexclusive meant that price fixing was impossible. If prices ever rose above the individual license level, any
artist would be permitted to make unlimited individual sales.
No cartel can survive except by reducing output, and a nonexclusive agreement among a large number of participants does
not permit an output reduction.
The Supreme Court’s Maricopa decision three years later
deserved similar treatment but did not receive it.256 The defendants were about 1,750 physicians practicing in diverse areas, who made up about 70% of the practicing physicians in
Maricopa County.257 They entered a nonexclusive agreement258 stipulating the maximum fees that they would charge
for listed medical procedures. This information was compiled
for employers to select as a health coverage option. Under the
Maricopa Plan, an insured who selected a Plan member would
be guaranteed the rate named in the Plan agreement. If the
insured went to a nonmember, reimbursement would be paid
at the agreed-upon rate but the insured would have to pay any
excess.259
255
Compare Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), in which
the court inferred a plausible hub-and-spoke conspiracy from the fact that individual Uber drivers each agreed with Uber to charge a rate that they assumed
would be charged by other drivers as well. Under that reasoning, if Wal-Mart
offers to purchase potatoes at wholesale for ten cents per pound and one hundred
growers deliver them, that is evidence that the growers conspired with each other
on the price. The Supreme Court did not make this error in BMI. The Uber
arrangement, just as BMI, is a production agreement rather than a distribution
agreement. As in BMI, the Uber drivers did not agree to drive exclusively for Uber
and no one else. Collusion was unthinkable.
256
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
257
Id. at 339.
258
See id. at 360 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[P]hysicians who participate in the
foundation plan are free both to associate with other medical insurance plans—at
any fee level, high or low—and directly to serve uninsured patients . . . .”).
259
Id. at 341.
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The Court struck the agreement down as per se maximum
price fixing.260 In his dissent, Justice Powell protested that the
Court had acted on too thin a record.261 More likely, however,
the problem was definitional. The majority was hung up by the
fact that what the physicians did was “price fixing,” but without
asking whether this was a production agreement or a distribution restraint.262 Clearly it was the former. As in BMI, a nonexclusive arrangement among 1,750 cartel members would never
have been able to pull off the kind of output reduction that
collusion requires.
Rather, this aggregation of physicians was devising an insurance plan that differs from most plans today in that it left
more risk with the insured; they were guaranteed a fee-forservice price but still had to decide how much and what kind of
care to purchase. As a result of Maricopa, the government, to
this day, distinguishes the antitrust legality of insurance plans
depending on the degree of physician or insurer risk they contemplate.263 Plans are thought to be lawful under the antitrust
laws if they take an expected value approach to prices, such as
85% of anticipated medical needs, rather than a straight up fee
for service approach.
The debate over how much risk should be borne by insurers and how much by insureds is an important one, but it is
not an antitrust debate unless the challenged agreement is simply a cover for price fixing. Even risk-bearing plans incorporate
considerable diversity about risk assumption. For example,
one might offer 100% coverage of a certain procedure while
another might offer only 50%, or perhaps require a copay and
then pay 80% of the balance. These should not be decisions
with antitrust significance. Antitrust has done its job when it
has concluded that the agreement at issue is one of production
design rather than distribution. At that point, the insurance
industry can decide about the plan’s merits as an insurance
product.

260
Id. at 348. For good commentary, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum
Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981). See also 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2007 (3d ed. 2012).
261
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 357–58 (Powell, J., dissenting).
262
See id. at 361–62.
263
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 1–8 (1996), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
atr/legacy/2007/08/15/1791.pdf [https://perma.cc/B72X-MR5N].
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CONCLUSION
An antitrust policy driven by concerns for consumer welfare should favor design and production initiatives but disfavor
restraints on pricing. Indeed, it is more important for antitrust
policy to get the innovation question right than to be right on
price. Innovation has the potential to affect economic development much more dramatically—in both directions. That is,
just as innovation benefits the economy by a greater amount
than price competition under constant technology, so too a
restraint on innovation can do greater harm.264
So, antitrust policy makers must be able to distinguish
practices primarily affecting innovation or production design
from those that principally affect price. This obligates defendants to articulate their defenses carefully. If an antitrust defense acknowledges that the profitability of a restraint depends
on the defendants’ ability to increase price or reduce output,
then they have all but admitted that theirs is a naked restraint
about price. That is why the defense in the Apple e-Books case
could not succeed. The defendants effectively admitted to a
cartel-imposed price increase because they believed that Amazon’s prices were too low.265
To answer the question posed at the beginning of this article, antitrust policy should be more concerned with restraints
on distribution, but distribution must be properly defined. By
focusing so much on price, antitrust policy has often missed
the point of some arrangements, particularly those that involve
new technologies or innovations in organization. In the process, it has confused innovation with monopoly. For example,
antitrust’s long war with tying arrangements occurred because
litigants and courts were obsessed with pricing and either
never queried, or else did not appreciate, how tying relates to
innovation and production. By their nature, innovations upset
a market’s equilibrium, producing temporarily higher returns
in cases of success, or losses when they fail. As a result, a
common feature of innovation is short-run prices that are
above cost and welfare reducing to the myopic eye. These are
essential features of innovation-intensive markets, however,
and in such cases the social cost of false condemnation is high.

264
265

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 243–45.
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